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This article analyzes recent developments in Florida crimi-
nal law. The areas discussed include constitutional challenges to
legislative enactments, search and seizure, confessions, speedy
trial, pleas of guilty and nolo contendere, evidence, jury instruc-
tions, sentencing and the death penalty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys major recent developments in Florida crim-
inal law.' The purpose of the article, however, is not to "digest" all
of the decisions, but to describe the more significant holdings and
place the decisions in the context of developing doctrine.'
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS
A. First Amendment
This year, the Supreme Court of Florida decided three major
first amendment cases: McCall v. State,3 Brown v. State4 and
Matthews v. State.5 The analysis presented in each of these cases
should provide the legal community of Florida with a valuable in-
sight into the direction in which the court is moving in this expand-
ing constitutional area.
In McCall,' a parent had confronted her daughter's teacher
regarding the teacher's method of disciplining the child. During the
confrontation, the parent used profane language in the presence of
approximately fifty of the teacher's pupils. The parent was charged
with violating section 231.07 of the Florida Statutes, which imposes
1. Volumes 350 through 362 So. 2d. The discussion of searches and seizures, confessions,
speedy trial, guilty pleas, jury instructions and sentencing represents a continuation of the
discussion of those topics presented in Hatchett & Norton, Criminal Law, 1977 Developments
in Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1007 (1978).
2. The authors have indicated their opinions concerning the correctness of the result
reached in particular cases. Justice Hatchett, however, notes that he does not wish to indicate
prejudgments as to the correct disposition of any particular cases prior to their proper presen-
tation on appeal. This article is intended as a review and analysis of legal principles.
3. 354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978).
4. 358 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1978).
5. 363 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1978).
6. 354 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1978).
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criminal liability upon anyone "who upbraids, abuses or insults any
member of the instructional staff on school property or in the pres-
ence of the pupils at a school activity."' The parent moved to dis-
miss the charges alleging that the statute was an unconstitutional
violation of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, "because on its face .. . [it was] a
standardless, vague, overbroad statute, which include[d] within its
prohibition constitutionally protected words."'
In holding that section 231.07 was unconstitutional, the Su-
preme Court of Florida made it clear that its analysis of the case
could not be limited solely to a review of the specific language used
by the defendant.' The activity described as unlawful by section
231.07 related to "language used in a particular place dedicated to
a special purpose for the benefit of special people" 10-i.e., schools.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the critical question was whether
the statute had been "narrowly tailored" to proscribe only that
activity which was incompatible with the normal activity of a
school." Applying this standard, the court hypothesized that a
hundred year old woman, sitting on school property at midnight
with no students present, who told a teacher that the quality of his
7. FLA. STAT. § 231.07 (1975). Violation of this section is a misdemeanor of the second
degree. Id.
8. 354 So. 2d at 870. The statute was also attacked on the ground that it violated FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 4, which provides:
Every person may speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects but
shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and
civil actions for defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter
charged as defamatory is true and was published with good motives, the party
shall be acquitted or exonerated.
9. The court stated that it was "clear that if we were concerned solely with the language
used by appellant, her conviction would be overturned under our recent opinion in Spears v.
State, 337 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976)." 354 So. 2d at 870.
10. 354 So. 2d at 870.
11. At this point, the court applied the test enunciated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 354 So. 2d at 871.
In Grayned, a demonstrator at a high school was convicted of violating both an anti-
picketing ordinance which outlawed demonstrations near schools that were in session, and
an anti-noise ordinance which prohibited the willful making of noise or any other type of
diversion on grounds adjacent to a school while the school was in session. The Supreme
Court declared the statute prohibiting picketing to be unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds, but upheld the anti-noise statute against challenges of vagueness and overbreadth.
In approving the anti-noise statute, the Court noted:
Designed, according to its preamble, "for the protection of Schools," the ordi-
nance forbids deliberately noisy or diversionary activity that disrupts or is about
to disrupt normal school activities. It forbids this willful activity at fixed
times-when school is in session-and at a sufficiently fixed place-"adjacent"
to the school.
408 U.S. at 110-11 (emphasis by the Court).
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work was poor, could be convicted under section 231.07.11 The court
concluded that since such harmless conduct could be penalized, the
statute was unconstitutionally overbroad."
In Brown v. State, 4 the Supreme Court of Florida was con-
fronted with a challenge to section 847.04 of the Florida Stat-
utes-Florida's "open profanity" statute. 5 Although section 847.04
had been previously upheld by the court against a similar challenge
in State v. Mayhew,"1 the defendant attacked the statute on the
grounds that it was unconstitutional on its face because it sought
to regulate pure speech and was vague and overbroad. 7
In revisiting this constitutional question, the court in Brown
recognized that its prior attempt to construe narrowly the statute
was without support from any limiting statutory language. 8 Since
persons of common understanding, upon reading the plain language
of the statute, could reasonably conclude that the mere utterance
of the proscribed language without more could subject them to pun-
ishment, the statute created an impermissible chilling effect on the
exercise of free speech, rendering it unconstitutional and incapable
of redemption."
To support this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida, as
in McCall, gave examples of protected speech that could be prose-
cuted under the broad language of the statute. The court noted that
a person could shout profanities while in an open field and if, un-
known to the speaker, those words were heard by another person,
the speaker could be subject to criminal prosecution under section
847.04.20 According to the court, such analysis proved that the stat-
12. 354 So. 2d at 872.
13. Id. The court noted that the defendant's conduct was certainly sufficient to upbraid,
abuse and insult the teacher and that there was no doubt that the confrontation occurred on
school grounds in the presence of students. The court further noted, however, that the defen-
dant could not be punished under the statute even though her conduct was reprehensible,
since someone engaged in protected speech could be punished under the same statute. Id.
(citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)).
14. 358 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1978).
15. FLA. STAT. § 847.04 (1975) which provides: "Whoever, having arrived at the age of
discretion, uses profane, vulgar and indecent language, in any public place; or upon the
private premises of another, or so near thereto as to be heard by another, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree . ... "
In Brown, the' defendant had been convicted for uttering offensive remarks while in the
presence of a police officer. 358 So. 2d at 17.
16. 288 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1973). In Mayhew, the court construed § 847.04 in a manner that
would support its constitutionality, finding only language that would necessarily incite a
breach of the peace to be prohibited. 288 So. 2d at 244.
17. 358 So. 2d at 17.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id. at 20.
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ute impermissibly proscribed mere speech. The court then recog-
nized the importance of first amendment freedoms in classic form:
"[Tihe freedom to speak one's thoughts is the matrix, the indis-
pensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom ....
'Because First. Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow
specificity.' ""'
In Matthews v. State,22 the Supreme Court of Florida indicated
that the scope of review for challenges to statutes alleged to be
unconstitutionally overbroad and restrictive of free speech as
applied will be much narrower than the review afforded to chal-
lenges of the Brown and McCall type. The facts of Matthews as
adduced by the court from the record were:
On December 20, 1974, a young black man was shot and killed
by a deputy sheriff in Escambia County. The shooting became
the subject matter of a grand jury investigation which resulted
in a finding that the deputy fired in self-defense. [Matthews]
and other members of the black community staged several dem-
onstrations in protest. Among other things, the demonstrators
demanded removal of the deputy from office. At one of these
demonstrations, [Matthews] led the crowd in the following
chant: "Two, four, six, eight, who shall we assassinate? Doug
Raines, Doug Raines, Sheriff Untreiner, Askew, and the whole
bunch of you pigs. '2
At trial, the state alleged that Matthews was guilty of extortion 2'
because he had verbally and maliciously threatened injury to Sher-
iff Untreiner in order to compel the dismissal of Deputy Raines.
Matthews was convicted of extortion and was sentenced to five
years in prison. 5 The District Court of Appeal, First District, af-
firmed the conviction rejecting Matthews' argument that as applied
to him the extortion statute violated his rights under the first, fifth
21. Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
22. 363 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1978).
23. Id. at 1068.
24. FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (1973) provides:
Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously
threatens to accuse another of any crime or offense, or by such communication
maliciously threatens an injury to the person, property or reputation of another,
or maliciously threatens to expose another to disgrace, or to expose any secret
affecting another, or to impute any deformity or lack of chastity to another, with
intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with
intent to compel the person so threatened, or any other person, to do any act or
refrain from doing any act against his will, shall be guilty of a felony of the second
degree. ...
25. 363 So. 2d at 1968.
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and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States."5 The supreme court found that Matthews' conduct consti-
tuted a real and substantial "criminal threat" and not mere
"political hyperbole."27 Thus, according to the court, application of
the extortion statute to Matthews' conduct passed muster under the
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Watts v. United States.28
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to inquire into
the scope and purpose of the extortion statute and limited its review
instead to a determination of whether there existed competent evi-
dence in the record on appeal to support the conclusion of the dis-
trict court, and whether the district court had applied the correct
rule of law. 2 In discussing the scope of its review, the court stated:
[It transcends the scope of our review to substitute our judg-
ment for that of the jury, the trial judge, and the District Court
of Appeal, First District, and to determine upon our view of the
same evidence in the record that the statute was unconstitutional
as applied to appellant.3
26. Id. Interestingly, the First District ruled on this question even though it apparently
had not been preserved in the trial court. By passing upon the validity of the statute, however,
the district court preserved the question for appeal to the supreme court under FLA. CONsT.
art. V, § 3(b)(1). 363 So. 2d at 1067-68.
27. 363 So. 2d at 1069.
28. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
In Watts, the defendant was convicted of threatening the President in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 871(a) (1964). The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that a
statute may prohibit only those spoken words which constitute a "true threat" as distin-
guished from speech which is protected by the first amendment. In discussing the nature of
the threat made by Watts regarding his pending induction into the armed forces ("If they
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Id. at 706), the
Court stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner
fits within the statutory term. . . . The language of the political arena, like the
language used in labor disputes, . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact
.... Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the
statute and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted
otherwise.
Id. at 708 (citations omitted).
29. 363 So. 2d at 1069.
30. Id. Unfortunately, under this analysis it seems that, except in very rare cases, the
highest court in the state would always be bound by a lower court's determination that a
statute had been constitutionally applied. It is arguable that, in a first amendment case, the
state's highest court should review the scope and intent of the statute as well as everything
in the record.
In this context, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated that in cases involving
alleged first amendment violations, it would make an independent examination of the whole
record to assure itself that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field
of free expression. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 285 (1964); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
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Applying this standard, a majority of the court found sufficient
evidence in the record to support the district court's findings."
In a vigorous dissent in Matthews, 32 one justice argued that the
lower courts had failed to address two questions critical to the first
amendment determination: first, whether the "assassination" cheer
voiced by Matthews and other demonstrators was directed to incit-
ing, threatening, or producing imminent violence, and second,
whether these cheers were likely to incite or produce such lawless
action.3 3 According to the justice, this inquiry was required by
Brandenburg v. Ohio.34 In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court of the
United States held:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action. . ... A statute which fails to draw
this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guar-
anteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps
within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has im-
munized from governmental control.35
The Matthews dissent argued that this test had actually been ap-
plied in Watts and, if applied in Matthews, would require acquit-
tal.3 In closing, the justice reminded the court:
The protections of the First Amendment encompass all of our
citizens, whether black militants or Ku Klux Klan members.
Only by allowing our citizens to voice their political opposition
to the fullest extent possible can we encourage use of the open
political forum and inhibit the growing tendency of clandestine
violent attacks as a means of political change.37
31. 363 So. 2d at 1069. The court found evidence in the record that some demonstrators
had possessed sticks and clubs, that members of the crowd had passed a steak knife from
one to another, that some members of the crowd had made abusive remarks directly to police
officers and that demonstrators spat on two police officers. Id.
32. Id. at 1070 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional an Ohio
statute which prohibited advocating the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform. The statute was held invalid because it could not be narrowly construed to
proscribe only advocacy of violence directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and which advocacy vas likely to incite or produce such action. Id. at 448-49.
35. Id. at 447-48.
36. 363 So. 2d at 1073-74.
37. Id. at 1075.
19791
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B. Insanity Defenses
In State ex rel. Boyd v. Green,3 the Supreme Court of Florida
dealt a death blow to section 918.017 of the Florida Stat-
utes'l-Florida's new statutory scheme which provided for a bifur-
cated trial when a defendant raised the defense of insanity. In
Green, the trial court ruled that section 918.017 constituted a denial
of due process, but upheld the constitutionality of the section of the
statute" which had repealed the previous insanity defense proce-
dure. The trial court concluded that, as a result of this repeal and
the unconstitutionality of section 918.017, the defense of insanity no
longer existed in Florida and ordered the case to proceed to trial
38. 355 So. 2d 789 (1978).
39. FLA. STAT. § 918.017 (1977) provided:
Separate proceedings on issue of insanity.-
(1) When, in a criminal case, it shall be the intention of the defendant to
plead not guilty and to rely on the defense of insanity, no evidence of insanity
shall be admitted until it is determined through trial or by plea whether the
defendant is guilty or innocent of committing or attempting to commit the alleged
criminal act. Advance notice of intention to rely upon the defense of insanity shall
be given by the defendant as provided by rule. Upon a finding that the defendant
is guilty of the commission or attempted commission of the criminal act, a trial
shall be promptly held, either by the same trial jury, if applicable, or by a new
jury, in the discretion of the court, solely on the question of whether the defendant
was sane at the time the criminal act was committed or attempted. The defendant
shall have the option, with approval of the court, of waiving the jury trial on the
issue of sanity and allowing the determination of sanity to be made by the judge.
Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the
issue of sanity, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, except as prohibited by the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of the State of Florida. However, the defendant [shall be] given
the opportunity to rebut any such evidence. If the jury or the judge shall deter-
mine that the defendant was guilty of committing or attempting to commit the
criminal act and was sane at the time, then the court shall proceed as provided
by law. If it is determined that the defendant was guilty of committing or at-
tempting to commit the criminal act but was insane at the time, the court shall
adjudicate the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity.
Section 918.017 codified 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-321, § 1 (footnote omitted). 1977 Fla. Laws
ch. 77-321, § 10 repeated the previous insanity procedure contained in FiA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210,
which provided in pertinent part:
(a) At Time of Trial.
(1) If before or during trial the court, of its own motion, or upon motion of
counsel for the defendant, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is
insane, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the
defendant's mental condition. The defendant shall designate his attorney to serve
as his representative under Fla. Stat. § 394.459(11), F.S.A., in the event the
defendant is found mentally incompetent. The court may appoint not exceeding
three disinterested qualified experts to examine the defendant and to testify at
the hearing as to his mental condition. Other evidence regarding the defendant's
mental condition may be introduced at the hearing by either party.
40. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-321, § 10.
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without benefit of that defense."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the trial
judge's ruling that section 918.017 was unconstitutional. 2 The court
stated that the statute would preclude an insane defendant from
rebutting intent at the first trial and would limit the second trial to
the question of insanity. Intent, however, is an essential element of
most crimes and the state would be relieved of its burden of proving
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the
defendant is precluded from offering evidence to negate the pre-
sumption of intent. According to the court, this constituted a clear
denial of due process.
The supreme court disagreed, however, with the trial judge's
ruling that the repeal provision was constitutional. The court held
that although the repealer, standing alone, would be constitutional,
[t]he manifest purpose of Chapter 77-312, Section 1, was to
establish a two trial system for the adjudication of guilt and
insanity. This procedure being clearly inconsistent with the pro-
cedure outlined in Rule 3.210, repeal of the rule was a logical part
of the new legislative scheme. The two provisions are so con-
nected and dependent on each other as to warrant the belief that
the Legislature intended them as a whole. Where one provision
is unconstitutional, all provisions dependent on it must also fall. 3
C. Habitual Petit Larceny Offenders
Section 812.021(3) of the Florida Statutes" provides for en-
41. 355 So. 2d at 791.
42. Id. at 794.
43. Id.
Justice England concurred with the court's invalidation of § 918.017, but stated that its
invalidity should not have been grounded on due process considerations. According to the
justice, § 918.017 would violate due process only if the second stage of the trial was conducted
before a jury different from the one which determined the defendant's commission of the
physical acts of the crime. While that was a possibility under § 918.017, it was not a necessity.
Id. at 795.
The justice argued that such an inquiry was, however, irrelevant:
Whether the same or a different jury considers insanity, however, it seems
clear to me that the legislature overstepped constitutional bounds when it elected
to shift the presentation of evidence on the insanity issue into a second stage of
trial proceedings. It is our constitutional responsibility alone to prescribe the
"course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, process or steps" by which
the substantive elements of a crime are presented in a criminal proceeding. . ..
I would hold Section 921.131(1) invalid as an encroachment on this Court's exclu-
sive power to "adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts." Article
V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
44. FLA. STAT. § 812.021(3) (1977), states:
Larceny of property not described in subsection (2) is petit larceny, which consti-
19791
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hanced punishment of habitual petit larceny offenders. Pursuant to
section 812.021(3), if the state could charge and offer proof at trial
that a defendant had at least two prior convictions for petit larceny,
a conviction could be imposed for the enhanced offense, subjecting
the offender to a felony sentence rather than a misdemeanor jail
term.
In State v. Harris," defendants were charged with petit larceny.
The state charged that defendants, having been twice convicted of
that offense, were subject to the enhanced punishment provided by
section 812.021(3) and sought to introduce evidence of those prior
convictions at trial. The trial judge granted defendants' motion to
dismiss, ruling that section 812.021(3) was unconstitutional "in that
it deprived defendants of due process and equal protection of the
law and destroyed the historical presumption of innocence by the
inclusion of prior convictions in the charging information.""
On appeal by the state, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed
the trial court, construing section 812.021(3) "so as to make it con-
stitutional." 7 The court interpreted section 812.021(3) to create the
substantive offense of "felony petit larceny."' , According to the
court, the legislature had the right to create such an offense, but the
supreme court had "the right to dictate the procedure to be em-
ployed in the courts to implement it."" The court then rendered its
constitutional construction of the statute:
We therefore hold that Section 812.021(3) creates a substantive
offense to be tried in the circuit court when felony petit larceny
is charged, without bringing to the attention of the jury the fact
of prior convictions as an element of the new charge. Upon con-
viction of the third petit larceny, the Court shall, in a separate
proceeding, determine the historical fact of prior convictions and
questions regarding identity in accord with general principles of
law, and by following the procedure now employed under Section
775.084.10
tutes a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082
or s. 775.083. Upon a second conviction of petit larceny, the offender shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082
or s. 775.083. Upon a third or subsequent coiviction of the offense of petit larceny,
the offender shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided
in s. 775.082, a. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
45. 356 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1978).
46. Id. at 316.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 317.
49. Id.
50. Id. (footnotes omitted). FLA. STAT. § 775.084(3)(c) (1977) provides: "Except as pro-
vided in paragraph (a), all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights
of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel."
[Vol. 33:955
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D. Statutory Presumptions
The Supreme Court of Florida again addressed the constitu-
tionality of an irrebuttable presumption in MacMillan v. State.5
MacMillan had been charged with using electricity from a utility
company without first letting it pass through a company meter in
violation of section 812.14 of the Florida Statutes.52 At trial, Mac-
Millan asserted that the statute was unconstitutional because it
placed an untenable burden upon property owners by requiring
them to be custodian, caretaker, insurer and protector of the per-
sonal property of the utility company, and because, pursuant to
section 812.14(3), 53 a prima facie case of guilt was made if there
existed any device on the property which diverted electricity past
the meter box. The defendant argued that this statutory presump-
tion was irrational and arbitrary. The trial judge upheld the consti-
tutionality of section 812.14(3), and MacMillan was convicted.54
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, applying "a rational
connection" standard," held that section 812.14(3) was unconstitu-
tional. 5 According to the court, under the challenged statute the
presumed fact of intent to violate came into play merely upon proof
that the property upon which diversion of some sort had occurred
was in the actual possession of the accused, or upon proof that the
accused had received a direct benefit from the utility. The court
stated that it could not conclude with any substantial assurance
51. 358 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
52. FLA. STAT. § 812.14 (Supp. 1976).
53. Id. § 812.14(3), provided in pertinent part:
The existence, on property in the actual possession of the accused, of any connec-
tion, wire, conductor, meter alteration, or any device whatsoever, which effects
the diversion or use of the service of a utility or a cable television service or
community antenna line service or the use of electricity, gas, or water without the
same being reported for payment as to service or measured or registered by or on
a meter installed or provided by the utility shall be prima facie evidence of intent
to violate, and of the violation of, this section by such accused.
54. 358 So. 2d at 547.
55. The court applied the rational connection standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court of the United States:
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irrational" or
"arbitrary," and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with sub-
stantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend. And in the judicial assessment the
congressional determination favoring the particular presumption must, of course,
weigh heavily.
358 So. 2d at 549 (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)) (emphasis by the
Supreme Court of Florida).
56. 358 So. 2d at 550. Although the court held that § 812.14(3) was unconstitutional, it
did not invalidate the remainder of § 812.14. The court stated that since deletion of subsection
3 would not disturb the valid portion of the statute, subsection 3 was severable. Id.
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that the presumed fact that the defendant was guilty of that crime
was more likely than not to flow from the proved fact of possession
of the premises or receipt of the benefits. One in actual possession
of property or one receiving direct benefits would not more than
likely be the guilty person. The court stated that common experi-
ence taught that the device or apparatus tampered with or altered
was generally on the outside of a building and accessible to anyone;
that direct benefits from the use of the electricity would be com-
monly derived by any occupant of the premises-family member or
business associate; and that the billing that would constitute notice
to the owner of possible diversion was only sent once a month.
Moreover, a diversion could be effected by a simple alteration made
by a prankster, a vandal or an angry neighbor, causing unknown
benefit to the user and invoking the criminal presumption. 7
E. Exclusions and Exemptions
In Purifoy v. State," the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the
difficult question of whether the state or the defendant has the
burden of proving the weight of contraband in a marijuana prosecu-
tion case5' where the substance possessed by the defendant contains
both prohibited and nonprohibited material."
Prior to discussing the merits, the supreme court noted the
"crucial difference"' between statutory exclusions and exemptions.
According to the court, a defendant who claims an exclusion is
arguing that his particular conduct is not criminal, whereas a defen-
dant who claims the benefit of an exception is arguing that although
his conduct would otherwise be criminal, he has a statutory excuse.
The importance of this distinction is that once a defendant raises a
statutory exclusion as a defense, the absence of the exclusion is
considered an essential element of the crime that the state must
prove by substantial evidence. On the other hand, a defendant has
the burden of proving that his conduct was exempted-statutorily
excused-since there is nothing to excuse until the state has proven
the elements of the crime.'"
Against this background, the court noted that the defendants
57. 358 So. 2d at 550.
58. 359 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1978).
59. In Purifoy, the defendants had been charged with possession of more than five grams
of cannabis. Id.
60. FLA. STAT. § 893.02(2) (1977) specifically excludes "mature stalks" from the statutory
definition of cannabis.
61. 359 So. 2d at 448.
62. Id. at 449.
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in Purifoy had denied that the matter in their possession was a
prohibited substance. Their defense was not merely one of a legal
excuse which they were attempting to assert after the state had
proven all the essential elements of the crime. Thus, the court held
that where a portion of the substance introduced by the state as
contraband is claimed by the defendant to be a nonprohibited mat-
ter, it becomes the state's burden to prove that the weight of the
contraband alone (i.e., minus any "mature stalks") exceeds the
statutory threshold of five grams. 3 The court stated that to hold
otherwise would not only place an intolerable burden on criminal
defendants, but would also contravene the fundamental rule that
the prosecution must prove every essential element of the crime
charged. The statutory exclusion of "mature cannabis stalks" was
not an exemption, but an integral part of the definition of this
contraband.64
In State v. Buchman," the Supreme Court of Florida reaf-
firmed the Purifoy exclusion-exemption distinction. The defendants
in Buchman had been charged with the sale of unregistered securi-
ties in violation of section 517.07 of the Florida Statutes.6 At trial,
the circuit court judge ruled unconstitutional section 517.17 of the
Florida Statutes,67 which placed the burden of proving a statutory
exemption to section 517.07 on the defendants. The trial court held
that the statute in essence required a defendant to give up his con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination. The trial judge allowed
the prosecution to go forward, but in order to cure the self-
incrimination and due process problems, he ruled that the state
would have the burden of proving that the defendants were not
entitled to a statutory exemption.6
63. Id.
64. Id. In Purifoy, the state had argued that the burden of proving that the contraband
weighed less than five grams due to the presence of nonprohibited matter was on the defen-
dant pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 893.10(1) (1975), which provides:
It shall not be necessary for the state to negative any exemption or exception set
forth in this chapter in any indictment, information, or other pleading or in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this chapter, and the burden of going
forward with the evidence with respect to any such exemption or exception shall
be upon the person claiming its benefit.
65. 361 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1978).
66. FLA. STAT. § 517.07 (1977) (repealed 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168, § 3, effective July 1,
1980).
67. Id. § 517.17 (repealed 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-168, § 3, effective July 1, 1980), which
provides:
Burden of Proof.-It shall not be necessary to negative any of the exemptions
provided in this part in any complaint, information, indictment, or any other writ
or proceedings brought under this part, and the burden of establishing the right
to any exemption shall be upon the party claiming the benefit of such exemption.
68. 361 So. 2d at 693-94.
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On certiorari, the supreme court held that it was not the intent
of the legislature to make the lack of an exemption an essential
element of a section 517.07 violation. Rather, the court felt that the
existence of an exemption in a particular case is an affirmative
defense available to the defendant. The defendant's rights against
self-incrimination are not violated by this scheme, since the defen-
dant is not required to furnish any information before the state has
proven a prima facie case of guilt."9 Thus, the court made clear that
the characterization of a defense as an exclusion or exemption will
dictate which party must carry the burden of proof.
F. Statutory Vagueness and Criminal Intent
In State v. Allen,70 the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a
challenge to the constitutionality of section 812.041(1) of the Florida
Statutes7 -Florida's theft statute. Section 812.041(1) provides:
A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or uses, or endeavors to
obtain or to use, the property of another with intent:
(a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property
or a benefit therefrom.
(b) To appropriate the property to his own use or to the use
of any person not entitled thereto.
In Allen, defendants argued that section 812.041(1) failed to
require that the proscribed conduct be "unlawful," thus eliminating
the requirement of specific criminal intent in violation of their due
process rights; and that the term "endeavors," as used in the stat-
ute, was impermissibly vague. The trial court agreed and dismissed
the case.72 On appeal by the state, the supreme court reversed,
holding that there was no evidence to support the trial court's con-,
clusion that the 1977 Florida Legislature intended, by its omission
of the word "unlawful," to eliminate specific criminal intent as an
element of the offense. In so holding, the supreme court noted that
the jurisprudence of this state had long recognized the element of
specific criminal intent to be a necessary requisite to a larceny con-
viction.7" In addition, the court dismissed the vagueness challenge
to the use of the word "endeavors," by construing that term to
require proof of an overt act manifesting criminal intent, rather
than merely proof of the formulation of a mental intent.7"
69. Id. at 695.
70. 362 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
71. FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1) (1977).
72. 362 So. 2d at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 33:955
CRIMINAL LAW
Schultz v. State75 presented the Supreme Court of Florida with
a vagueness challenge to section 849.231 of the Florida Statutes, 76
which proscribes the manufacture, sale, purchase or possession of
gambling devices. In Schultz, the trial judge rejected the defen-
dants' vagueness challenge and construed section 849.231 to mean
that the gambling devices specifically identified in the statute (e.g.,
crap table, roulette wheel) were unlawful per se.7 The trial judge
also instructed the jury that the modifying phrase in the statute,
"ordinarily or commonly used or designed to be used in the opera-
tion of gambling houses or establishments, ' 78 did not pertain to the
per se proscription of the specifically identified items. Thus, accord-
ing to the trial judge's instructions, proof that a crap table or rou-
lette wheel was an ordinary or commonly used gambling device was
not a prerequisite to conviction under the statute." Prior to a review
of section 849.231, the Supreme Court of Florida set out the stan-
dards against which a statute challenged on vagueness and over-
breadth grounds must be measured:
A statute is unconstitutionally vague when men of common un-
derstanding and intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing. . . .A statute is overbroad when legal, constitutionally pro-
tected activities are criminalized as well as illegal, ,unprotected
activities, or when the Legislature sets a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders and leaves it to the courts to step inside and
determine who is being lawfully detained and who should be set
free.8 0
Applying these standards, the supreme court stated that sec-
tion 849.231, as construed by the trial court, was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad because, as construed, it would proscribe the
possession of children's toys which resembled, or could be identified
by name as, any of the items specified in the statute. In addition,
possession of stage props purporting to be a roulette wheel or a crap
table, but not designed for gambling nor commonly or ordinarily
used for gambling, would be a punishable offense. 8' The court con-
cluded by holding that the trial court had improperly construed
section 849.231. According to the court, the statute only proscribed
the manufacture, sale, purchase or possession of such items as were
75. 361 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1978).
76. FLA. STAT. § 849.231 (1977).
77. 361 So. 2d at 418.
78. FLA. STAT. § 849.231(1) (1977).
79. 361 So. 2d at 418.
80. Id. (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 418-19.
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ordinarily or commonly used or designed to be used in the operation
of a gambling establishment. Thus, as construed, section 849.231
was neither unconstitutionally vague and indefinite nor overbroad."
In a case decided the same day as Schultz, the Supreme Court
of Florida rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to Flor-
ida's "simple child abuse" statute.83 In State v. Joyce,"' the state
brought a consolidated appeal from the trial court's determination
that section 827.04(2) was vague, indefinite and overbroad. On ap-
peal, defendants argued that the trial court's dismissal was consis-
tent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Winters."
In Winters, the Supreme Court of Florida had held that section
827.05 of the Florida Statutes,8" which criminalized "negligent
treatment of children," was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite
and overbroad. In Joyce, however, the court determined that
Winters was distinguishable since section 827.05 made criminal
mere acts of simple negligence-conduct which was neither willful
nor culpably negligent. The "simple child abuse" statute under
attack in Joyce, on the other hand, required willfulness, scienter or
culpable negligence. The court noted that the Supreme Court of the
United States had often fipheld the constitutionality of statutes
challenged as vague, on the grounds that the statutes required
scienter as an element of the offense. 7 The requirement of willful-
ness, scienter or culpable negligence in the child abuse statute
therefore avoided the infirmity present in Winters.
The supreme court noted further that, although the statutory
use of the term "necessary" was faulted in Winters for failing to
provide sufficient guidelines for determining what facts constitute
82. Id. at 419.
83. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1977), provides:
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child
to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who,
knowingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the
child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree ....
84. 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
85. 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977).
86. FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1977) provided:
Negligent treatment of children.-Whoever, though financially able, negli-
gently deprives a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of, necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permits a child to live in an environ-
ment, when such deprivation or environment causes the child's physical or emo-
tional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly
impaired shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . . ..
87. 361 So. 2d at 407 (citing United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29
(1963); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)).
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a deprivation of necessary items great enough to fall within the
proscriptions of the statute, the dicta in that decision did not render
all statutes containing the term "necessary" void for vagueness.
Rather, each statute must be examined to determine whether per-
sons of common understanding can comprehend the meaning of that
word' when read in conjunction with the entire act."8
In Graham v. State,8' the Supreme Court of Florida once again
discussed the standard of criminal responsibility required as a pred-
icate to criminal liability. In Graham, the defendant was charged
with violation of section 370.13(2)(f) of the Florida Statutes, which
made it unlawful "for any person. . . willfully to molest any [stone
crab] traps, lines, or buoys . . . belonging to another without the
permission of the permit holder."'" In the trial court, the defendant
argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
failed to inform the average citizen of the conduct proscribed and
that the statute was overbroad because it proscribed essentially
innocent conduct. The trial court rejected this argument, and the
defendant was convicted."
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the term
"molest" was not so vague as to render the statute unconstitutional
since its common definition was sufficient to warn an average man
of the conduct prohibited. Furthermore, the court stated that it was
not necessary to reach the question of overbreadth because the trial
judge had properly narrowed the scope of the statute to only those
acts which were willful or malicious in nature, and had instructed
the jury accordingly.2 In so holding, the supreme court noted that
while criminal responsibility may rest on acts of negligence, such
negligence is generally of a higher degree than that required to es-
tablish civil liability. In prior opinions, the court had held that the
degree of negligence required to sustain a criminal conviction should
be at least as high as that required for the imposition of punitive
damages in a civil action. According to the court, such negligence
generally must demonstrate
"a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of
human life or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous
effects; or that entire want of care which would raise the pre-
sumption of indifference to consequences; or such wantonness or
recklessness or grossly careless disregard of safety and welfare of
88. 361 So. 2d at 407.
89. 362 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1978).
90. FiA. STAT. § 370.13(2)(f) (1977).
91. 362 So. 2d at 925.
92. Id.
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the public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others, 120
which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them.""
Since the supreme court in Graham was unable to determine from
the record whether the defendant's conviction was predicated upon
a finding of willfulness or mere negligence, it reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial.
In State v. Rou," the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that
potential harm to a defendant's reputation and career, at least in
the case of a public official, is a factor to be considered in a vague-
ness challenge. In Rou, a county commissioner was charged by infor-
mation with using his official position to secure a "special privilege"
for a friend. It was charged that he located a public road adjacent
to the friend's property, contrary to the established county road
program, and thereby enhanced the value of that property, thus
violating section 112.313(3) of the Florida Statutes." At trial the
defendant argued that section 112.313(3) was unconstitutionally
vague. The trial judge agreed and dismissed the information.
On appeal by the state, the supreme court agreed with the trial
judge's ruling. The court stated:
The statute is unconstitutionally vague and leaves its enforce-
ment to the whims of prosecutors. It does not "convey a suffi-
ciently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when mea-
sured by common understanding and practice. . . ." [T]he
terms "special privileges or exemptions" afford one no guidelines,
no "ascertainable standard of guilt,". . . no barometer by which
a public official may measure his specific conduct."
The state unsuccessfully argued that any constitutional infirm-
ity was cured by the requirement that a conviction must be based
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officeholder acted
with specific intent to benefit himself or another in derogation or
disregard of the general public welfare. The court stated that this
would merely require an after-the-fact determination of what acts
best promoted the public good. This, according to the court, was
insufficient since, although an adjudication of not guilty may "clear
the name of the official charged with the ethical violation, . . . it
93. Id. at 926 (quoting Russ v. State, 140 Fla. 217, 220, 191 So. 296, 298 (1939)) (emphasis
omitted by the Graham court).
94. 366 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978).
95. FLA. STAT. § 112.313(3) (1973) (current version at id. § 112.313(6) (1977)). Section
112.313(3) provided: "No officer or employee of a state agency, or of a county ... shall use,
or attempt to use, his official position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself
or others, except as may be otherwise provided by law."
96. 366 So. 2d at 385 (citations omitted).
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cannot undo the harm inflicted upon him and his career by such a
charge.""
The Supreme Court of Florida struck down another official mis-
conduct statute on vagueness grounds in State v. Deleo." In Deleo,
several employees of the City of Hollywood were charged with offi-
cial misconduct in violation of section 839.25(1)(c) of the Florida
Statutes,"9 because they had "violated, with corrupt intent to obtain
benefit for themselves, a statute relating to their office." 1"® Defen-
dants' motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that section
839.25(1)(c) was vague and susceptible to arbitrary application in
violation of the Constitutions of the United States and Florida was
granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed section
839.25, which provides in pertinent part:
(1) "Official Misconduct" means the commission of one of
the following acts by a public servant, with corrupt intent to
obtain a benefit for himself or another or to cause unlawful harm
to another:
(c) Knowingly violating, or causing another to violate, any
statute or lawfully adopted regulation or rule relating to his off-
ice. 101
According to the court, since "Official Misconduct" under subsec-
tion (c) was
keyed into the violation of any statute, rule or regulation, pertain-
ing to the office of the accused, whether they contain criminal
penalties themselves or not, and no matter now minor or trivial
. . . an appointed employee could.be charged with official mis-
conduct, a felony in the third degree and punishable by up to five
years in prison or a fine up to $5,000, for violating a minor agency
rule applicable to him, which might carry no penalty of its own. 10
As such, the court concluded that section 839 .25(1)(c) was suscepti-
97. Id. at 386. In Rou, Justice England wrote a dissenting opinion with which two justices
concurred. Justice England argued that the plain meaning of the terms used in § 112.313(3)
was sufficient to convey a definite warning as to what conduct was proscribed. Id.
98. 356 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1978).
99. FLA. STAT. § 839.25(1)(c) (1977).
100. 356 So. 2d at 307. The state alleged that the defendants had violated FLA. STAT. §
112.313(7) (1977) "in that they had employment or held a contractual relationship with a
business entity sulject to the regulation of or doing business with the City." Id.
101. FLA. STAT. § 839.25 (1977).
102. 356 So. 2d at 308 (footnotes omitted). The court rejected the state's argument that
requiring proof of corrupt intent saved the statute from its susceptibility to arbitrary applica-
tion. Id.
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ble to arbitrary application and was thus unconstitutional.
In State v. Rodriquez, 101 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
a constitutional vagueness challenge to section 409.325(2)(a) of the
Florida Statutes which provides that "[a]ny person who knowingly
. . . uses, transfers, acquires, traffics, alters, forges, or possesses
* . . a food stamp. . . in any manner not authorized by law is guilty
of a crime."'' 0 Two trial courts had dismissed charges against the
various defendants in Rodriquez because they found the language
"in any manner not authorized by law" to be unconstitutionally
vague.
On appeal, a sharply divided supreme court held that the
phrase "not authorized by law" meant not authorized by state and
federal food stamp regulations, and that the statute was sufficiently
definite to inform the defendants that their conduct in selling non-
food items for food stamps was proscribed.'10 Three justices dis-
sented, arguing that the provisions of section 409.325(2) (a) failed to
delineate expressly what acts were proscribed, so that a person who
knowingly possessed or transferred food stamps could never be cer-
tain that he was not doing so in a "manner not authorized by law.'"
In conclusion, despite indications to the contrary in Deleo and
Rou, a general review of the cases indicates that a statute containing
somewhat ambiguous language may still be upheld against a vague-
ness challenge if the statute can reasonably be construed to require
proof of criminal intent as an essential element of the crime.'17 Fur-
103. 365 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1978).
104. FLA. STAT. § 409.325(2)(a) (1977).
105. 365 So. 2d at 160.
106. Id. at 161. In his dissent, Justice Sundberg waxed indignant at the majority's
treatment of the statute:
Although I cannot be absolutely sure of it, I believe that a majority of the
Court today has potentially sanctioned an enactment by the Legislature which
would make unlawful as a discrete crime "the doing of any and all acts in any
manner not authorized by law." It could appropriately be entitled the "Omnibus
Prevention of Unlawful Conduct Act." Of course, conduct not authorized by law
is not limited to criminal conduct but includes any act in contravention of the
common law or statute, civil or criminal. To my mind, there is little difference
between my hypothetical "Omnibus Prevention of Unlawful Conduct Act" and
the provision here under consideration. This statute does nothing more than to
state that it shall be unlawful to act in any manner not authorized by law and
then provides a criminal sanction.
Id.
107. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Leeman v. State, 357 So. 2d
703 (Fla. 1978). There, the defendant was charged with violating FLA. STAT. § 817.482 (1975),
which prohibits possession of any electronic device capable of duplicating tones used in long
distance telecommunications for purposes of avoiding payment for long distance telephone
calls. The defendant, citing Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), argued that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous and was susceptible of application
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thermore, it appears that due process may require that every crimi-
nal conviction in Florida be based upon proof of the individual's
criminal intent or culpability. Even where a particular statute does
not require the state to prove specific criminal intent, a defendant
should be permitted to present evidence negating general criminal
intent or culpability. 08
G. Unlawful Delegation of Authority
The Supreme Court of Florida in High Ridge Management
Corp. v. State'°1 again emphasized that statutes delegating legisla-
tive authority to administrative agencies must contain objective
guidelines and standards sufficient to prevent unbridled discretion
or whim on the part of the agency responsible for enforcement of the
act."10 In High Ridge, the operators of twenty-one nursing homes
sought a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the Omnibus
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1978,"' challenged the constitution-
ality of the Act, and requested the court to enjoin the state from
enforcing it. Sections 400.23(3) and (4)112 of the Act established a
rating system for nursing homes based on criteria to be promulgated
by the administrative agency in charge of investigation and licens-
ing. The nursing homes argued that the Act was, an invalid dele-
gation of legislative power because these provisions provided no
guidelines to the agency as to whether the average nursing home
should be rated "A," "B" or "C," whether only a very few nursing
homes should be able to attain an "AA" rating, or whether there
would be a bell curve or flat percentage of homes in each group.
On appeal from the circuit court's denial of the declaration, the
Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stressing the fact that sections
400.23(3) and (4) failed to provide guidelines sufficient to protect
against unfairness or favoritism in their application."3
to those persons possessing such a device who had no intent to violate the criminal laws. The
Supreme Court of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the statute, stating that the
offense clearly requires proof of criminal intent.
108. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, see Coffin v. State, 374 So. 2d
504 (Fla. 1979) (rehearing denied). Such proof of criminal intent may not be necessary, how-
ever, in the prosecution of corporate entities for the violation of regulatory statutes where the
legislature has clearly indicated its intention of creating a strict liability criminal offense.
109. 354 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1977).
110. See also Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969) (legislature must leave
nothing to unbridled discretion of agency responsible for enforcement); Smith v. Portante,
212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968) (express or reasonably inferrable guidelines required in act
delegating powers).
111. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-201 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 400.011-.565 (Supp. 1976)).
112. FLA. STAT. §§ 400.23(3)-(4) (Supp. 1976).
113. 354 So. 2d at 380.
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The Supreme Court of Florida applied a similar standard in
State v. Cumming."' In Cumming, the defendant had been charged
with unlawful possession of an ocelot in violation of section 372.922
of the Florida Statutes,"' which proscribes possession without a
permit of any "wildlife" as defined in the statute. At trial, Cum-
ming attacked the statute on the grounds that it was so vague as to
prevent one from ascertaining whether a permit would be required
in any given case, and that it was an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive authority in that it failed to provide the Florida Game and
Fresh Water Fish Commission with adequate guidelines for imple-
mentation. Cumming also attacked the rules promulgated by the
Commission under the statute as vague and overbroad."' The trial
judge agreed and dismissed the case.
On direct appeal, the supreme court held that the statute used
language sufficiently definite to put owners of wildlife on notice that
a permit is required, and therefore the statute was not unconstitu-
tionally vague. In addition, the court held that the statute did not
unconstitutionally delegate legislative authority because the statu-
tory guidelines adequately described the bounds within which the
Commission was to promulgate its rules. The court held, however,
that the rules were unconstitutionally overbroad because they did
not sufficiently define the standards upon which the permit would
be granted or denied. This vested the Commission with an imper-
missible amount of discretion."' Consequently, the court held that
without a valid permit procedure available to owners of wildlife
covered by the statute, no prosecution for lack of a permit was
possible.
114. 365 So, 2d 153 (Fla. 1978).
115. FLA. STAT. § 372.922 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is unlawful for any person or persons to possess any wildlife as defined
in this act, whether indigenous to Florida or not, until he has obtained a permit
as provided by this section from the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission.
(3) The commission shall promulgate regulations defining Class I and II
types of wildlife. The commission shall also establish regulations and require-
ments necessary to insure that permits are granted only to persons qualified tc
possess and care properly for wildlife and that permitted wildlife possessed as
personal pets will be maintained in sanitary surroundings and appropriate neigh-
borhoods.
116. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 16E-5.051, .052 (1976).
117. 365 So. 2d at 155-56. In particular, the court stated that although the terms
'qualified persons," "sanitary surroundings" and "appropriate neighborhoods" as used in §
372.92 were adequate guidelines to the Commission, the terms were too vague as used by the
agency in § 16E-5.051. 365 So. 2d at 155-56.
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III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. Illegal Stops
It is now well-settled law in Florida that a police officer may
not stop and question a person on mere suspicion of illegal activity.
In Mullins v. State,'" a police officer observed the defendant riding
a bicycle slowly through a residential area in the very early morning
hours. The officer stopped the bicyclist and asked him to identify
himself and to explain his activities. During this conversation, the
officer detected a strong odor of marijuana and saw a clear plastic
bag containing a brown substance protruding from the defendant's
shirt pocket. The defendant was then arrested and the contraband
seized. In reversing the trial and appellate courts,"' which had held
the detention to be reasonable, the Supreme Court of Florida stated
that the bicyclist's actions were clearly insufficient to give rise to
anything more than a bare suspicion of illegal activity, and accord-
ingly, the officer had no authority to make the initial stop. 2t
Similarly, in Foss v. State, "I police stopped a vehicle based on
mere suspicion without any probable cause that ha crime was being
committed or that any traffic laws were being violated. The officers
had observed the vehicle travelling ten to fifteenmmiles per hour
below the speed limit. The car was not being driveh erratically, but
the officers had observed a passenger slumped over in the seat.
Upon stopping the vehicle, the police observed in plain view a bag
of marijuana in the possession of the passenger. The district court
reversed the trial judge, stating these circumstances were insuffi-
cient to give the police either a reasonable belief that an emergency
existed, or a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity on the part
of the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, the police had no right
to stop the vehicle or question the occupants. The court held that
the contraband seized as a result of the illegal stop should have been
suppressed.'
118. 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1978).
119. Mullins v. State, 353 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). The district court opinion in
Mullins was in direct conflict with Coladonato v. State, 348 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1977).
In Coladonato, police stopped a vehicle because it was unusual to a particular area at a
particular time. Contraband subsequently observed in plain view was rendered inadmissible
because the initial stop, based on such bare suspicion, was held illegal.
120. 366 So. 2d at 1163. In so holding, the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the
continuing validity of Coladonato.
121. 355 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
122. See also McClure v. State, 358 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), wherein police
observed a man going into the apartment of a well-known drug dealer. When the man re-
turned to his vehicle, he had stopped and stared at the police cruiser for 15 to 30 seconds.
The police turned on their flashing light and asked the driver for identification. A bag of
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. Stop and Frisk
If a police officer validly stops an individual for questioning, he
may frisk that individual only if he has probable cause to believe
that the person may be armed." 3 In Frazer v. State,' the police
were called to investigate a disturbance. Upon arriving at the scene,
the police stopped and frisked the defendapt, an apparent by-
stander, and discovered a bag of marijuana. The seizure was held
invalid because the police had no indication that the defendant was
involved in the affray nor any indication that the defendant might
be carrying a weapon. 125
Even if police validly stop and frisk an individual for weapons,
they are not allowed to extend that pat-down search in order to
uncover other evidence of criminal activity. In Meeks v. State,2
police stopped and frisked a defendant and felt a three-inch-wide
and five-inch-long bulge in the defendant's pocket. The police offi-
cer then reached into the defendant's pocket, pulled out a plastic
bag of marijuana and arrested the defendant. The district court
reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress the evi-
dence, stating that the seizure was illegal because the police officer
admitted that he never believed the bulge to be a weapon but rather
suspected it was a bag of marijuana.'27
C. Consent
Although a person may voluntarily consent to a search, the
police may not obtain that consent through coercion. When the
state seeks to justify the seizure of evidence based upon consent, it
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
freely and voluntarily consented to the warrantless search.
marijuana observed in plain view was ordered suppressed because the police did not possess
sufficient facts for a well-founded suspicion of criminal activity justifying an investigatory
detention.
123. FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (1977), the Florida stop and frisk law authorizes police to
detain temporarily persons under circumstances reasonably indicating that such person has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Furthermore, when an officer has
probable cause to believe that the person temporarily detained is armed, he may conduct a
limited search for the purpose of and to the extent of disclosing such weapon.
124. 362 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
125. Id. at 170. In reaching this decision, the court applied the Supreme Court of the
United States' standard for stop and frisk: "'[In justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' " Id. (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
126. 356 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
127. Id. at 46.
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In Taylor v. State,'28 a law enforcement officer stopped a boat
to investigate an expired commercial registration certificate and
other possible violations of the fishing laws. The officer boarded the
defendant's vessel and began questioning him. After the defendant
denied having any fish on board, the officer asked what the defen-
dant had in an icebox cooler on deck. The officer opened this cooler
without waiting for permission and looked inside. Nothing incrimi-
nating was discovered, so the officer asked if he could look into the
fish hold. The defendant made no response, but pulled open the
hatch because he believed the officer had the authority to search the
boat. At no time was the defendant informed that he had a right to
refuse the police request to search his boat. Upon inspection of the
hold, the officer discovered a large quantity of marijuana. At trial,
the defendant's motion to suppress was denied. 2 '
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
versed the trial court's finding that the defendant had voluntarily
consented to the search. The court noted that there is a clear dis-
tinction between mere acquiescence to apparent authority of a law
enforcement officer and unqualified consent. The court stated that
such mere acquiescence to a search does not necessarily constitute
a waiver of the necessity for a valid search warrant. Rather, for a
person to waive his search and seizure rights, it nist clearly appear
that he voluntarily permitted or expressly invited and agreed to the
search. Thus, under the totality of the circumstances involved in
Taylor, especially the illegal activity of the Marine Patrol officer in
conducting a search of the icebox on deck without a warrant and
without consent, the defendant's acquiescence in the search of the
hold was involuntary. 3 ' In addition, the court recognized that an
illegal arrest or an illegal search presumptively taints and renders
involuntary any subsequent confession or admission obtained from
the victim of the search or arrest. 13
128. 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
129. Id. at 182.
130. Id. at 185-86. See also Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975). In Miranda v. State,
354 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), however, the district court recognized that Marine Patrol
officers may board a boat temporarily moored in state waters to inspect the owner's boat
registration and crawfish permit and thereafter conduct a warrantless search of the vessel
based upon the smell of marijuana detected by the officers.
131. 355 So. 2d at 184 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)). Also, in interesting
dicta, the court reaffirmed the vitality of the exclusionary rule in Florida:
Although there has been some suggestion that the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule should be altered or abolished. . . the rule of Mapp v. Ohio...
remains intact. In addition, even if the federal exclusionary rule is changed, this
in no way affects the fifty year old rule in Florida that evidence seized in violation
of Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution is inadmissible in evidence
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In Gonterman v. State,'32 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, applying a similar standard, invalidated a search con-
ducted by state agricultural inspection officers. In Gonterman, the
defendant had agreed to a flashlight search of his vehicle through a
window but denied the officers permission for a more thorough
search of the contents of the truck. "Consent" was obtained only
after the defendant had been arrested for bypassing the inspection
station, had been repeatedly asked to consent by the officers, and
had been told by the inspectors that they possessed the authority
to make a search with or without the defendant's consent. According
to the court, such consent was "clearly involuntary.' ' 3
The fact that a person is confronted by an armed, uniformed
officer, however, is not sufficient to invalidate a subsequent consent
to search. In Bagocus v*' State, 34 the defendant had driven his
pickup truck, with a camper attachment, past an agricultural
inspection station on an interstate highway. Two agricultural
inspection officers pursued and stopped his vehicle. The officers told
the defendant that he had passed an agricultural inspection station
and that they would like to inspect the contents of his truck. The
defendant opened the camper back on his pickup truck, and one of
the officers climr bed inside. The officer found several bags which
were taped shit2'The officers then directed the driver to return to
the inspection station, and on the way, Bagocus told the officers he
would like to "work something out."'3 3 At the officers' request, the
defendant again admitted them to the rear of his truck at the
inspection station where they discovered that the taped-up bags
contained marijuana. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
stated that the agricultural inspection officers were entitled to stop
the pickup truck when it passed the inspection station and to re-
quest the driver to permit an inspection of his vehicle. The court
stated further that it was unwilling to find consent involuntary as a
matter of law any time that uniformed agricultural inspection offi-
cers, carrying weapons which they did not brandish in any way,
asked a driver to permit an inspection of his vehicle. 3
.. .. In Florida the exclusionary rule is not merely a judicial construct but is
written into the Constitution itself."
Id. at 184 (citations omitted).
132. 358 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 596.
134. 359 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
135. Id. at 886.
136. But cf. Powell v. State, 332 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (no consent where
defendant was given three options: waiting for key, breaking open lock or waiting for inspector
to obtain search warrant); Sarga v. State, 322 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (no consent
where officer demanded three times to open truck).
[Vol. 33:955
CRIMINAL LAW
D. Electronic Surveillance
Chapter 934 of the Florida Statutes"7 provides a comprehensive
system that prohibits the interception of electronic and oral com-
munications except by authorized persons under specifically de-
fined circumstances. In State v. Walls,'3 the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld the constitutionality of section 934.06 of the Florida
Statutes"'3 -the cornerstone of chapter 934. In Walls, an extortion
victim made tape recordings of an extortion threat made at his
home. In a criminal action against the' extorter, Walls, the trial
court denied admission of the tape recordings into evidence because
the interception had not been made under the direction of a law
enforcement officer or with the consent of the pariies to the conver-
sation. " ' In granting Walls' motion to suppress, the trial court re-
jected the state's argument that sections 934.02(2), 934.03 and
934.06 were overbroad."'
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the trial
judge's ruling. The court, however, characterized the state's over-
breadth arguments as effectively requesting the court to create an
exception to sections 934.03 and 934.06. This request was denied out
of hand because the language of the statutes was clear and unambi-
guous and because the recordings were clearly proscribed. The court
concluded by noting that chapter 934 represents a proper exercise
of legislative authority "designed to effectively protect the privacy
of oral and wire communications and to protect the integrity of
court and administrative proceedings.""'
An exception to the general rule that interception of wire or oral
communications is prohibited unless all parties thereto have given
their consent is delineated in section 934.03(2)(c)."1 This exception
permits warrantless interception of communications under the
137. FLA. STAT. §§ 934.01-.10 (1977), as amended by 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-376, 4H 1-3
(codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 934.03, .09, .10 (Supp. 1978)).
138. 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).
139. FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1975), provides:
Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or oral
communication.-Whenever any Wire or oral communication has been inter-
cepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived
therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision
thereof, if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
140. Thus, the electronic recording did not fall within any of the situations permitting
interception delineated in FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2) (1975).
141. Id. §§ 934.02(2), .03, .06 (1975).
142. 356 So. 2d at 296.
143. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) (1975).
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direction of law enforcement officers where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent, and the purpose of the
interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act. In Aalderink v.
State, "I the District Court of Appeal, Second District, added a judi-
cial gloss to section 934.03(2)(c). The court made it clear that as a
condition precedent to the admission at trial of recordings falling
within this section, the party consenting to the interception must
testify to his consent and be available for cross-examination by the
defendant.
Section 934.02(4)(a),' the "business use" exception, provides
another exception to the general proscription of chapter 934. This
section permits interception of oral communications by an employer
monitoring the phone calls of employees in the ordinary course of
business. In State v. Nova,' the Supreme Court of Florida made it
plain that this exception would be carefully limited to those instan-
ces where the employer was acting in the capacity of employer as
required by the ordinary course of business."'
Section 934.09148 permits nonconsensual wiretapping by law
enforcement officers if done pursuant to a warrant accompanied by
an affidavit containing a "full and complete statement" that other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or appear un-
likely to succeed."' In Zuppardi v. State,50 the Supreme Court of
Florida took occasion to discuss the parameters of section
934.09(1)(c). The court stated that although the interception of pri-
vate communications should not be permitted as a routine matter
of criminal investigation where more conventional techniques might
be successfully employed, neither should law enforcement officials
144. 353 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
145. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(4)(a) (1977).
146. 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
147. In Nova, the defendant had filed a motion to suppress the testimony of Juanita
Bentley, a supervisor, concerning a threat the defendant had made against Belinda Revel
during a telephone conversation he had with Revel prior to her death, which conversation was
overheard by Bentley on an extension telephone. After an evidentiary hearing on the matter,
the trial court denied the motion to suppress, determining that Bentley used the telephone
extension to listen in on the conversation of her employee in her capacity as employment
supervisor, for the benefit of her employer and in the ordinary course of business. Defendant
was convicted, but the district court reversed. On certiorari, the supreme court reversed,
finding that the defendant had called Revel at her place of employment, the call was received
by her on a company telephone, and that a previous telephone call to Revel from defendant
that same morning had left her visibly upset. Thus, the court held that the job supervisor
properly listened in on the phone call in order to find out why her employee had become upset.
Id. at 413.
148. FLA. STAT. § 934.09 (Supp. 1978).
149. Id. § 934.09(1)(c).
150. 367 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1979).
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be compelled to endanger themselves and their informants before
wiretaps are made available. Moreover, according to the court, the
purpose of the "full and complete statement" requirement is not to
insure that every other imaginable method of investigation has been
unsuccessfully attempted prior to use of electronic surveillance, but
to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of
conventional investigative techniques.""
In Cuba v. State, 52 the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
made it clear that section 934.09(1)(c) affidavits must be presented
to a "neutral and detached magistrate" and must not be based on
"stale information."'53 In Cuba, the court noted that the affidavit
in question was presented to a circuit judge, clearly meeting the
"neutral and detached" requirement. In addressing the staleness
issue, the court noted that the information upon which the affidavit
was based was only three, four and five days old. Moreover, the
court stressed that where the nature of the criminal activity being
investigated involved a protracted and continuous course of con-
duct, as in Cuba, the passage of time takes on less significance. 5'
IV. CONFESSIONS
A. Preservation of Issue for Appeal
A challenge to the admissibility of a confession on the grounds
that it was involuntarily made should be raised in a pretrial motion
to suppress.' An objection at trial alone may not be sufficient to
preserve the defendant's right to appeal the admissibility of the
confession.15 The pretrial motion and determination is required in
order that the state be given a right to appeal any adverse decision.
Even if a pretrial motion and determination has been made, how-
ever, it still may be necessary in some instances for a defendant to
make an additional motion challenging the admissibility of this
evidence at trial in order properly to preserve the right to object on
appeal. '57
151. Id. at 604. In Zuppardi, the court noted that the affidavit explained that the sus-
pects, targets of the wiretap, were known to deal exclusively with club members, that they
communicated only through codes, and that all available informants were unable or unwilling
to assist law enforcement personnel in establishing direct contact with the suspects due to
fear of physical danger. Id.
152. 362 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
153. Id. at 31-32.
154. Id. at 32.
155. FLA. R. CIM. P. 3.190(i)(2).
156. Wingert v. State, 353 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
157. Id. at 645.
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The failure of defense counsel to make a proper objection to the
admissibility of a defendant's statement may constitute incompe-
tency of counsel, subjecting the conviction to collateral attack. In
Wingert v. State,I's however, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, made it clear that a decision not to seek suppression of a
confession does not establish incompetence of counsel where such a
decision represents a reasonable trial tactic. In Wingert, the court
noted that it was apparent from the record that the decision not to
seek suppression of a recorded statement was made because the trial
counsel felt that exculpatory portions of the statement were strong
enough to serve the purpose of getting the defendant's explanation
of the crime before the jury without putting the defendant on the
witness stand.
B. Joint Trials
Several recent Florida decisions have discussed the problems
involved when a confession of one defendant is introduced into evi-
dence during a joint 'trial with other codefendants. As a general
principle, a confession by one defendant, who does not testify at
trial, implicating other codefendants in a joint trial, is not admissi-
ble because the other codefendant is precluded from cross-
examining the truthfulness of the confession."' In Cook v. State,',
however, in a joint trial for sexual battery, the trial court permitted
into evidence the confession of three codefendants even though none
of these codefendants testified. Before trial, counsel for each defen-
dant had moved for severance because each apprehended the possi-
ble prejudicial effect of the statements. Rather than allow the cases
to be severed, the state chose to delete any reference to the other
defendants from each of the codefendants' statements."I The state-
ments, in edited form, were introduced at trial along with the trial
judge's caution to the jury that each statement was to be received
in evidence only against the defendant who had given the state-
ment. Nevertheless, the edited statements still indicated that var-
ious unmentioned codefendants were also involved in the crime;
leaving the jury to infer that the other codefendants charged in the
joint trial were those nameless individuals.
On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, deter-
mined that the standard to evaluate the propriety of such an edited
158. 353 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
159. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
160. 353 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
161. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.152 (b)(2)(ii) allows the state this option.
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statement is whether the "jury was 'highly likely' to determine from
a co-defendant's statement that the defendant was the nameless
individual incriminated by the statement, . . . even if the inference
drawn from the co-defendant's statement is incriminating only
when considered in light of other evidence discovered at trial."'
According to the court, under this standard, the admission of the
edited statements was a violation of the defendant's right to con-
front his accusers. The district court affirmed the codefendants'
convictions, however, stating that the overwhelming evidence intro-
duced against them at trial rendered the error harmless.'
In Matthews v. State,"' the state again chose to introduce an
edited version of a codefendant's confession rather than sever the
trial of the codefendants. In Matthews, even though any direct refer-
ence to either defendant by the other was excised by the prosecutor
prior to proffer of their statements, both defendants raised objec-
tions to portions of the statements which indicated that each code-
fendant was less culpable than the other. The defendants argued
that the deletion of either of these exculpatory statements would
have unduly prejudiced the defendant who made it, whereas the
admission of the statements would have allowed the jury to draw
adverse inferences from it against the other codefendant. On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed, stating that
even though the trial court had made .a good faith effort to edit the
statements in a manner which would not prejudice either defen-
dant, the trial court should have either excluded both statements
entirely or granted a severance and separate trials."'
In Matthews, the district court also discussed the proper proce-
dure to be followed by a trial court when confronted with such a
problem. First, the state must submit to the court and the defense
counsel an unedited copy of the defendant's statement. According
to the court, to allow the state to edit the statement beforehand
would defeat the purpose of Rule 3.152(b)(2) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure and could lead to prejudice of the defendant or
a codefendant without any notice thereof to the court or the defense.
162. 353 So. 2d at 914.
163. Id. But see Russell v. State, 349 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
In Russell, two codefendants were tried for robbery in a joint trial. During the trial, the
court admitted a confession which contained a statement implicating the other codefendant
in the robbery. This statement in the codefendant's confession was the only evidence which
directly linked the other to that crime. The district court reversed the conviction of that
defendant on the grounds that the trial court erred in refusing to delete the incriminating
sentence prior to the admission of the confession at trial.
164. 353 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
165. Id. at 1276.
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Second, if a motion to sever is filed, all statements should be consid-
ered at that time and, if necessary, edited at the hearing on the
motion to sever rather than after the trial has begun.'
V. SPEEDY TRIAL
The speedy trial rule"7 was promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Florida to promote the efficient operation of the criminal justice
system in this state, as well as to minimize the hardships imposed
upon accused persons resulting from lengthy delays while awaiting
trial.'" The rights granted to criminal defendants pursuant to the
rule are based upon the Supreme Court of Florida's constitutional
rulemaking power, rather than an application of state and federal
constitutional rights."' Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida has
recognized that confusion and decisional conflict exist in the lower
Florida courts regarding the proper application of several provisions
of the speedy trial rule. In several decisions, the supreme court has
attempted to rectify this situation by construing and clarifying
these rules to achieve a more rational and consistent application in
accordance with the public policy goals for which they were enacted.
The Supreme Court of Florida has indicated that the state will
be strictly held to speedy trial time limits and that all defendants
will be discharged if the state fails properly to maintain these time
limits. 70 The trial court, however, retains great flexibility to grant
time extensions upon proof by the state that delay is justified by
exceptional circumstances.17' Naturally, on appeal a defendant may
still challenge the validity of the extension on the grounds that it
was an abuse of the trial court's discretion.7
166. Id.
167. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191.
168. Lewis v. State, 357 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 1978).
169. State v. Barnett, 366 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 2(a) grants the Supreme Court of Florida power to "adopt rules for
the practice and procedure in all courts."
170. State v. Barnett, 366 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978); Lewis v. State, 357 So. 2d 725 (Fla.
1978).
In general, FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.191 provides that every person charged with a crime shall
be, without demand, brought to trial within 90 days for misdemeanors and 180 days for
felonies, and upon demand, within 60 days. For persons already imprisoned, the time limits
without demand are one year for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies, two years for other
felonies and capital crimes; upon demand trial must occur within six months.
171. See Girrard v. McNulty, 348 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1977); FLA, R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2),
(f).
172. State v. Barnett, 366 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
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A. Extensions Pending Interlocutory Appeals
In the past, Florida district courts have been in sharp conflict
as to whether an interlocutory appeal by the state automatically
tolled the running of the speedy trial time limits during the pen-
dency of that appeal."' The pertinent provisions of the speedy trial
rule were amended by the Supreme Court of Florida to resolve this
issue, and now require the state to make an application to the trial
court for an extension during the pendency of an interlocutory ap-
peal.' Because of the complex procedural entanglements of some
criminal cases, calculation of the speedy trial time limits has not
always been simple when an interlocutory appeal was involved. In
light of clarifications rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida in
State v. Barnett, 171 however, the number of days which have lapsed
in the speedy trial period can be calculated with relative certainty.
In Barnett, the initial indictments charging four defendants
with bookmaking were dismissed by the trial court. New indict-
ments were returned and were dismissed as vague and indefinite.
The state filed an appeal in the district court to review this dis-
missal and also filed a motion in the trial court to toll the speedy
trial time limit pending disposition of the appeal, which motion the
trial court denied. T7 Prior to a determination of the merits, the
district court entered an order finding that the trial court should
have tolled the speedy trial time and granting the state a ninety day
extension. On the merits, however, the district court agreed with the
trial court that the indictments were fatally vague. Rather than
173. Compare State v. Small, 346 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) and State v. Pearch,
336 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) with Jenkins v. State, 349 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA
1977) and State v. Cannon, 332 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
174. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(d)(2), which provides:
When Time May be Extended. The periods of time established by this Rule for
trial may at any time be waived or extended by order of the court (i) upon
stipulation, signed in proper person or by counsel, by the party against whom the
stipulation is sought to be enforced, provided the period of time sought to be
extended has not expired at the time of signing, or (ii) on the court's own motion
or motion by either party in exceptional circumstances as hereafter defined, or
(iii) with good cause shown by the accused upon waiver by him or on his behalf,
or (iv) a period of reasonable and necessary delay resulting from proceedings
including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental
competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings on pre-
trial motions, for interlocutory appeals, for an appeal by the State from an order
dismissing the case, and for trial of other pending criminal charges against the
accused. For the purposes of this Rule, any other delay shall be unexcused.
Florida Bar re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 1247, 1256 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis
added to indicate amended portion).
175. 366 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978).
176. Id. at 413.
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pursuing its appeal further, the state filed new indictments in the
trial court. The trial court dismissed the new indictments, stating
as one of its grounds that the speedy trial time had expired. In so
doing, the trial court refused to toll the speedy time limit for that
time from the state's request for an extension until the receipt of the
district court's mandate."7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the speedy
trial time limit should have been tolled from the date the state filed
its motion for extension until the appellate mandate was received
by the trial court. Thus, upon receipt of the mandate, seventy-five
days remained within which to bring defendants to trial. Since the
trial court in Barnett improperly granted the defendant's motion for
discharge for violation of the speedy trial rule, the supreme court
remanded the case to the trial court with directions that the defen-
dants be brought to trial within a reasonable period of time from
receipt of the court mandate, not to exceed ninety days."'
B. Calculating Time Limits: Availability for Trial and Waiver
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved other clouded areas of
the speedy trial rule in Stuart v. State."' In Stuart, the court held
that for purposes of calculating the applicable time limitations, the
swearing of the weekly jury venire may not be equated with the
commencement of trial. Instead, the trial commences with the seat-
ing of the jury panel.8 ' Furthermore, the court held that under the
particular facts of the case, the defendant's participation in plea
bargaining did not constitute a waiver of strict compliance with the
speedy trial time limitations. In so holding, the court noted that the
defendant in Stuart had continuously asserted his readiness to go
to trial within the time limitations of the rule. 8 '
In Stuart, the Supreme Court of Florida also noted that the fact
that the defendant was not physically present in the courtroom on
the last day of the speedy trial period was not sufficient indication
of waiver, since the defense attorney asserted that the defendant
could be present in the courtroom on short notice. Moreover, the
court stated that no presumption of nonavailability attaches to a
177. Id. One hundred and five days of the 180 days available under the speedy trial rule
had elapsed between the dates the defendants were arrested and the date that the state filed
its motion for an extension of time during the pendency of its interlocutory appeal. Id.
178. Id. In addition, the supreme court held that the state is not required to file for an
extension of the speedy trial time limit when appealing erroneous discharges of defendants
for the state's alleged noncompliance with the speedy trial rule. Id.
179. 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
180. Id. at 409.
181. Id. at 410.
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defendant, and that the burden is on the state to prove that the
defendant was not continuously available for trial. 18
Finally, in Stuart, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the
state's claim that the speedy trial limit had been implicitly ex-
tended by the trial court when it postponed the trial due to the
absence of the state's chief witness. The state argued that this was
a sufficient "exceptional circumstance"'" to justify an extension of
the speedy trial limits. The supreme court noted, however, that the
procedural rules specifically exclude as an exceptional circumstance
the failure of the state to obtain available witnesses within the
speedy trial limits.'" Moreover, according to the court, such exten-
sions are not automatic or presumed from the circumstances, but
must be expressly requested in the trial court. Therefore, the state
was precluded even if an extension might have been justified since
it had never made such a request.'"
C. Prisoners
Generally, criminal defendants charged with felonies must be
brought to trial within 180 days of their initial arrest.18 Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b)(1) makes an exception to that time
limitation, providing that a person who is imprisoned in Florida and
subsequently charged by indictment or information shall be brought
to trial within one year, or within two years if charged with a violent
felony or capital crime. In Lewis v. State,'7 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that this section applies only to those defendants im-
prisoned in a state or county penal or correctional institution pur-
suant to a criminal judgment of guilt and not to defendants being
held in jail while awaiting trial.'"
182. Id. at 412. Once the state has made a prima facie showing of the defendant's lack
of continuous availability, however, the defendant has the ultimate burden of showing he was
continuously available for trial. McMullen v. State, 331 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Troy
v. State, 341 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Richardson v. State, 340 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1976).
183. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(0.
184. 360 So. 2d at 412 (citing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(f)).
185: Id. at 413.
186. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.191(a)(1).
187. 357 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1978).
188. Id. at 727. In Lewis, the supreme court also noted that situations of multiple prose-
cutions where one jurisdiction in this state seeks to prosecute a defendant awaiting trial in
another county constitute an exceptional circumstance that may be sufficient grounds for an
extension.
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VI. PLEAS OF GUILTY AND NOLO CONTENDERE
A defendant who pleads guilty waives any right to appeal errors
occurring before or during the acceptance of the plea. 18 Any review
of such errors can be obtained only through collateral attack."0 A
defendant, however, may appeal a sentence imposed following a
guilty plea on the grounds that it is excessive.1"' A defendant may
also enter a plea of nolo contendere expressly reserving the right to
appeal from a prior order of the lower court, identifying with partic-
ularity the point of law being reserved.'" An appellate court, how-
ever, will review such an alleged error only if its resolution would
be dispositive of the case and the question preserved is one of law,
not one of fact."3
The standard of review for error reserved on a plea of nolo
contendere is whether the record clearly indicates that the state's
case against a defendant challenging the admission of certain evi-
dence could not have succeeded without the use of that evidence.
In Brown v. State,"' the trial court denied the defendant's pretrial
motion to suppress a confession. Defendant thereafter pled nolo
contendere, preserving the suppression issue for appeal. On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed because the
record failed to show clearly that the state's case against the defen-
dant could not have succeeded without the use of the confession
sought to be suppressed. The court stated that absent a clear show-
ing by the defendant, it would not presume that the state's case
could not have succeeded without the use of the defendant's con-
fession."' The Third District concluded by discussing the scope of
appeal from a nolo contendere plea:
The purpose of the . . . rule is to expedite criminal litigation by
permitting defendants to plead nolo contendere while preserving
a legal question for appeal only where the question is entirely
dispositive of the case. That purpose is thwarted when a defen-
dant is permitted to appeal pre-trial rulings of a trial court which
are in no way dispositive of the case. Instead of expediting crimi-
nal litigation, such a procedure unnecessarily prolongs such
cases."'
189. Honeycutt v. State, 359 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
190. FLA. STAT. § 924.06(3) (1977), which provides: "A defendant who pleads guilty or
nolo contendere with no express reservation of the right to appeal shall have no right to a
direct appeal. Such defendant shall obtain review by means of collateral attack."
191. Smith v. State, 358 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
192. FLA. STAT. § 924.06(3) (1977).
193. Martinez v. State, 360 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
194. 355 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
195. Id. at 139-40.
196. Id. at 140.
[Vol. 33:955
CRIMINAL LAW
Although a defendant has no right to appeal from a plea of
guilty, he may in some instances ask the trial court for permission
to withdraw his guilty plea and appeal the denial of that motion."7
For example, a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea
where the record clearly indicates the plea was based upon a failure
of communication between the trial court and the defendant or
upon a misunderstanding of the facts.' In such a case, a defendant
must establish that an honest misunderstanding contaminated the
voluntariness of the plea.'
In State v. Reasbeck," the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that the state may similarly withdraw its plea bargain
offer at any time until it has been formally accepted by the court.
In Reasbeck, the district court stated that a plea bargaining offer
by the state does not constitute an enforceable contract and, there-
fore, may be withdrawn if the defendant has done nothing to his
legal detriment in reliance upon the state's offer.20I Once a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere has been accepted by the trial court, how-
ever, neither the state nor the court has the power to reject the plea
over the defendant's objections."'
VII. EVIDENCE
A. Comment on Defendant's Silence
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Clark
v. State,"0 3 a clear conflict existed among the district courts on the
question of whether a contemporaneous objection was necessary to
preserve as a point on appeal an improper comment on a defen-
dant's exercise of his right to remain silent. The sharpest conflict
appeared between the rulings of the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, in Bostic v. State,210 and the decision of the District
197. FLA. R. CIM. P. 3.170(f), which provides in pertinent part: "The court may in its
discretion, and shall upon good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty
to be withdrawn ....
198. See Surace v. State, 351 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1977); Thompson v. State, 351 So. 2d 701
(Fla. 1977); Birdsall v. State, 350 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
199., See authorities cited note 198 supra.
200. 359 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
201. Id. at 565.
202. State ex rel. Milton v. Strickland, 361 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); State ex rel.
Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
Even though a plea bargain has been accepted, the trial court may still impose a greater
sentence than that in the plea bargain agreement. Nevertheless, in such a situation, the
defendant must be given a clear opportunity to withdraw his plea and go to trial. Id.
203. 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978).
204. 332 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), rev'd, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978) (contempora-
neous objection not necessary).
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Court of Appeal, Second District, in Clark."' In both Bostic and
Clark, the state had admitted that the testimony elicited was im-
proper. The only legal question presented was whether such a com-
ment on silence constituted reversible error even in the absence of
an objection. In Clark, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
contemporaneous objection rule should be applied to this situation,
requiring an objection and motion for mistrial in order to preserve
the error and obtain a new trial.'"
In resolving this issue, the supreme court reviewed applicable
constitutional principles and state and federal precedent. According
to the court, it was clear that under Miranda v. Arizona,27 the
prosecution could not use the fact that a defendant had claimed his
privilege to remain silent in the face of accusation. It was also clear
that, if properly preserved for appeal, the admission of testimony
indicating the defendant's refusal to waive his right to silence con-
stituted reversible error. The Supreme Court of Florida further
stated, however, that such error was reversible without contempora-
neous objection only if it constituted "fundamental error"-that
error which goes to the foundation of the case or to the merits of the
cause of action.2' The court then held that even though an improper
comment on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent
represents constitutional error, it is not fundamental error.
In Clark, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded by providing
a comprehensive outline of the status of the law with respect to
comments on a defendant's exercise of his right to silence. First, it
is reversible error in a jury trial for a prosecutor to comment upon
or elicit an improper comment from a witness on the defendant's
exercise of his right to remain silent. This constitutes reversible
error even if a witness spontaneously volunteers the testimony. 20'
Second, in a nonjury trial, an improper comment will usually not
result in reversible error, but may serve as grounds for imposing
sanctions against the offending person."0 Third, no error occurs
when defense counsel comments on or elicits testimony concerning
the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent."' Fourth, when
an improper comment is made, the defendant must object and re-
quest a mistrial. A failure to object or to ask for a mistrial will be
205. 336 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (contemporaneous objection required).
206. Id. at 335.
207. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
208. 363 So. 2d at 333.
209. Id. at 334.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 334-35.
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considered an implied waiver of the error.2" Fifth, where the objec-
tion and motion for mistrial are made, the trial court must deter-
mine whether there was an improper comment. If the trial court
denies a mistrial and the defendant is convicted, the improper com-
ment may be raised as a point on appeal."' Sixth, if the defendant
fails to move for a mistrial and he is convicted, he may not object
for the first time on appeal."'
B. Marital Privilege
In Kerlin v. State, 5 the Supreme Court of Florida issued a
major opinion resolving the question of whether the evidentiary
privilege protecting communications between a husband and wife
extends to the observation of criminal conduct of one spouse by
another. In Kerlin, the court detailed the historical development of
the privilege and noted its public policy purpose. According to the
supreme court, the primary reason for the immunity is to protect
marital confidences which are regarded as so essential to the preser-
vation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the burden the
privilege places on the administration of justice.2 16 The court held
that it would be unwise to extend this privilege to exclude testimony
about criminal acts committed by one spouse and observed by the
other. The court stated that contrary to the policies for which the
rule was developed, such an application might prevent a spouse
from testifying about violence committed upon family members. "
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the
marital evidentiary privilege is a personal one which may be waived
by the communicating spouse. Such a waiver occurs either by fail-
ure to assert the privilege through objection or by a voluntary reve-
lation by the privilege holder.218 The court cautioned, however, that
the privilege is not waived merely because a defendant testifies in
his own behalf without revealing the contents of the confidential
communication with his spouse. Similarly, the defendant's spouse
may not be cross-examined concerning such conversations.21'
212. Id. at 334.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 352 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1977).
216. Id. at 51.
217. Id. at 52.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 52-53..
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C. Restrictions on Cross-Examination
Trial court restrictions on cross-examinations were reviewed on
numerous occasions in 1978. In Coxwell v. State,22 the Supreme
Court of Florida reaffirmed the broad scope of cross-examination of
witnesses, stating that it encompasses all subjects "germane to that
witness' testimony on direct examination." ' In Coxwell, at the
defendant's trial for the premeditated murder of his wife, a state
witness testified that the defendant had hired him to kill the wife.
The witness also stated that over a six month period he had dis-
cussed various plans for the murder with the defendant. During
cross-examination of this witness, the defense began to inquire
about the prior plans. The state objected to this line of questioning
on the ground that it was beyond the scope of direct examination,
and the objection was sustained.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stating that
although the scope of cross-examination is not without limits, cross-
examination of a witness on subjects covered by his direct testimony
is an absolute right, the denial of which constitutes reversible
error.12 Curtailment of the defense's inquiry, the court stated, ig-
nored "the expansive perimeters of subject matter relevance which
the constitutional guarantee of cross-examination must accommo-
date to retain vitality."'
In Coxwell, the Supreme Court of Florida declared that when
direct examination opens a general subject, cross-examination is not
confined to the specific facts of that testimony. Rather, it extends
to the "'"entire subject matter, and to all matters that may mo-
dify, supplement, contradict, rebut or make clear the facts testified
to . . . "'"225 Moreover, the court emphasized that defense coun-
sel cannot be denied the opportunity to elicit from the state's key
witness testimony which may lead to the development of a defense
theory or lay a predicate for subsequent impeachment of the wit-
ness.
226
Similarly, in Brown v. State,227 the District Court of Appeal,
220. 361 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1978).
221. Id. at 152.
222. Id. at 149-50.
223. Id. at 152 (citing Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1953)). In Coco, the supreme
court held that the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on subjects opened by direct
examination is an absolute right. 62 So. 2d at 894-95.
224. 361 So. 2d at 152.
225. Id. at 151 (quoting Coco v. State, 62 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1953) (quoting 58 Am.
JUR. Witnesses § 632, at 352 (1948))).
226. 361 So. 2d at 152.
227. 362 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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Fourth District, held the trial court's restriction of defense cross-
examination, directed to discrediting or impeaching the witness, to
be reversible error. In Brown, at defendant's trial for sexual battery
upon a minor, the child's testimony regarding sexual intercourse
with the defendant was corroborated by the child's mother, the
defendant's former girl friend. Defense counsel attempted to attack
the mother's credibility by showing the stormy past relationship
between her and the defendant, but the state's objection to this
inquiry was sustained by the trial judge. On appeal, the Fourth
District found that the mother's testimony was so incriminating
that if the jury believed the story, guilt was clear. The district court
concluded that without the right to impeach this damning testi-
mony, the defendant was defenseless and therefore reversed the
conviction.28
A further limit on the trial court's discretion to restrict cross-
examination was reaffirmed in Keane v. State.'" There, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, emphasized the defendant's right
to cross-examine a prosecution witness in reference to criminal
charges the witness is facing at the time he testifies. Thus, in Keane,
the Fourth District reversed the defendant's conviction because the
trial court had refused to allow defense counsel to question the
alleged victim about the victim's pending criminal charges.,
Questioning an adverse witness to demonstrate bias affecting
his credibility is also within the scope of cross-examination. In
Lombardi v. State,2" the defendant was charged with assaulting a
law enforcement officer. At trial, through his own testimony and
through cross-examination of the alleged victim, the defendant at-
tempted to introduce evidence of a civil suit he had filed against the
sheriff's department four years earlier.2'2 The trial court sustained
the state's objections to the cross-examination on the grounds that
remoteness in time rendered the civil suit immaterial. On appeal,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, holding that
the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial because it was clearly
important to demonstrating the bias and credibility of the wit-
ness.2 The court stated that the passage of four years time since
the suit had been filed went to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility.
228. Id. at 438.
229. 357 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
230. Id. at 458.
231. 358 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
232. Id. at 221.
233. Id. at 222.
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D. Restrictions on Defense Testimony
In Flynn v. State,"' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, held that where entrapment is asserted as a defense, the defen-
dants must be permitted to testify as to their motives and state of
mind at the time of the alleged entrapment. m In Flynn, during the
defendant's trial for delivery of cannabis, the trial judge refused to
allow the defendant to testify about a discussion he had with the
informant involved in setting up a drug transaction. In reversing,
the Fourth District emphasized that by excluding testimony rele-
vant to the defendant's state of mind, the trial court had removed
the heart of defendant's entrapment defense.36
In Banks v. State,37 a defendant charged with murder at-
tempted to support his claim of self-defense with the testimony of
witnesses concerning the deceased's reputation for violence. The
trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to introduction of
this testimony on the grounds that the defendant had not estab-
lished his prior knowledge of the deceased's reputation. On appeal,
the Fourth District reversed, stating that evidence of a deceased's
violent character is admissible when self-defense is asserted if the
issue involves either the conduct of the deceased or the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's belief that he is in imminent danger from
the deceased." 8 The Fourth District instructed that only when a
defendant seeks to prove that his actions were based on the de-
ceased's reputation for violence is it necessary that a defendant
establish prior knowledge of such reputation. In Banks, the victim's
reputation for violence was relevant to support the defendant's tes-
timony concerning the deceased's aggressiveness at the time of the
murder.21
In White v. State,"' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth Dis-
trict, held that it was reversible error for the trial judge in a burglary
prosecution to exclude defendant's testimony concerning his activi-
234. 351 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
235. Id. at 378.
236. Id.
237. 351 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
238. Id. at 1072.
239. Id.
In Jenkins v. State, 349 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the Fourth District held that
it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence of a previous attack on the defendant by
the victim where the defendant was relying on self-defense in his aggravated assault case.
Also, in Morofsky v. State, 354 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), the Fourth District held in
an aggravated assault case that testimony of threats made to the defendant by the victim's
brother should have been allowed into evidence. The court noted that the two brothers had
acted in a common scheme to force payment of a debt by the defendant.
240. 356 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
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ties on the night of the burglary. The trial judge had excluded the
testimony because the defendant had failed to reply to the state's
pretrial demand for notice of intention to claim alibi as required by
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.200. The Fourth District held
that where, as in White, the alibi is the defendant's only defense,
notice is not required under Rule 3.200.41 The court further noted
that since the alibi went to the heart of White's defense, the exclu-
sion of the testimony deprived the defendant of his right to be heard
in his own defense.
E. Proffer of Testimony
Generally, when a court denies the admission of certain testi-
mony, the attorney seeking the admission of this evidence should
make an offer of proof (proffer). The purpose of a proffer is to put
into the record that testimony which was excluded from the jury at
trial so that an appellate court can consider the admissibility of the
testimony."' It is ordinarily reversible error for the trial court to
deny a proffer of testimony for -the record. 43 The refusal of a trial
court to allow a proffer, however, may not be reversible error if all
of the testimony which could have been established on proffer was
allowed into evidence through the testimony of other witnesses.2'
A proffer must be clear and specific so that the appellate court
can determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the pro-
posed testimony.2" Counsel should therefore ensure that statements
constituting an offer of proof are reasonably specific and demon-
strate the purpose of proof offered unless such purpose is clearly
apparent. If the party attempting to introduce evidence does not,
by his offer of proof, make its purpose clear to the trial court, objec-
tion to a ruling denying admission of the evidence will not be consid-
ered by the appellate court, even though the party may have had a
legitimate purpose in proposing its introduction. 26
241. Id. at 57.
242. Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); see C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE 110-12 (2d ed. 1972).
243. M.P. v. State, 350 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (reversible error because prof-
fered testimony placed witness' credibility in issue and was essential to defense).
244. Williams v. State, 353 So. 2d 956 (Fla. lot DCA 1978) (proffer of testimony regard-
ing coercion of state's witness denied, but counsel allowed to cross-examine witness and police
officers involved in alleged coercion).
245. Phillips v. State, 351 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (proposed testimony of doctors
may have been relevant to assertion of self-defense in murder trial, but proffer was not clear
and specific enough for court to evaluate admissibility).
246. Id.
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VIII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Lesser-Included Offenses
In State v. A breau, "7 the Supreme Court of Florida clarified the
application of the harmless error doctrine to a trial court's failure
to give requested jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. In
A breau, prior to an inquiry into the merits, the court noted that the
distinction between the next immediate lesser offense, which is one
step removed from the offense charged, and an offense which is two
steps removed, is critical to this issue.
According to the court, it is prejudicial per se'for a trial court
to refuse to give instructions on the next immediate lesser-included
offense." 8 This error cannot be considered harmless because it is
impossible to determine if, given the complete instruction, the jury
would have "pardoned" the defendant to the extent of convicting
him on the lesser offense.2 '
The Supreme Court of Florida made it clear, however, that
where, as in A breau, the court gave instructions on the next imme-
diate lesser-included offense and only refused to instruct the jury on
an offense two steps removed, the harmless error doctrine does
apply.25 The court reasoned that in this situation "the jury is given
a fair opportunity to exercise its inherent 'pardon' power by return-
ing a verdict of not guilty as to the next lower crime." ''
247. 363 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
248. Id. at 1064 (citing Lomax v. State, 345 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1977)).
249. 363 So. 2d at 1064.
250. Id. In so holding, the supreme court stated that to the extent that Lomax v. State,
345 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1977), "intimates that the harmless error doctrine cannot be invoked
whenever there has been a failure to instruct on any lesser-included offense, it is disap-
proved." 363 So. 2d at 1064 (emphasis by the court).
251. 363 So. 2d at 1064. The court concluded by providing a helpful illustration of the
next immediate lesser-included offense-two step removed lesser-included offense dichot-
omy:
[I]f a defendant is charged with offense "A" of which "B" is the next immediate
lesser-included offense (one step removed) and "C" is the next below "B" (two
steps removed), then when the jury is instructed on "B" yet still convicts the
accused of "A" it is logical to assume that the panel would not have found him
guilty only of "C" (that is, would have passed over "B") so that the failure to
instruct on "C" is harmless. If, however, the jury only receives instructions on "A"
and "C" and returns a conviction on "A", the error cannot be harmless because
it is impossible to determine whether the jury, if given the opportunity, would
have "pardoned" the defendant to the extent of convicting him on "B" (although
it may have been unwilling to make the two-step leap downward to "C").
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B. Attempts
In State v. Thomas, " the Supreme Court of Florida recognized
that the requirement for instructions on lesser-included offenses
does not apply to an attempt to commit the substantive crime
charged, where the attempt itself is not a punishable crime. Thus,
in Thomas, where the defendant was charged with possession of
burglary tools and only the actual possession of burglary tools ac-
companied by a criminal intent or usage was a crime, no instruction
on attempt was required.2S
Similarly, in Hestor v. State,21' the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that where the elements of the crime charged
include an attempt, it is not necessary to give a separate instruction
on attempt. The reason for this rule is that where a crime is itself
an attempt to do an act or accomplish a result, there can be no
attempt to commit that crime. 55
C. Requested Instructions
Defense counsel's failure to object to a trial court's refusal to
give a particular jury instruction, or the failure to make a timely
objection, usually constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal.2"
Moreover, unless the standard jury instructions are clearly inade-
quate or erroneous under the circumstances, their use will not con-
stitute reversible error.27
Where, however, a defendant does not request a specific in-
struction at the charge conference but raises an objection to an
instruction before the jury begins deliberations, the trial court's
failure to give an appropriate instruction at that time may consti-
tute reversible error.5 8 Furthermore, a trial judge is required to
252. 362 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 1978).
253. Id. at 1350.
254. 363 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
255. King v. State, 339 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1976). 0
256. See Simpkin v. State, 363 So. 2d 45, 46-47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam); Jones
v. State, 358 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Stanley v. State, 357 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (Fla.
3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
257. See State v. Carrizales, 356 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1978). In Carrizales, defendant's re-
quested instruction on manslaughter was denied. Instead, the trial court instructed on self-
defense, excusable homicide and justifiable homicide because defendant had raised self-
defense as a defense theory. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed defendant's conviction,
stating that the standard instructions given by the trial judge adequately covered the prof-
fered defense. Id. See also Barket v. State, 356 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam); Rabin v.
State, 356 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
258. Bunn v. State, 363 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d DCA i978). In Bunn, the district court noted,
however, that tte "better practice" would have been for defendant to make a specific request
at the charge conference. Id. at 17.
19791
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
charge the jury on the law of the case,"5' and, regardless of whether
that instruction is standard or proposed by the defense, his failure
to do so is reversible error."'
D. Reinstruction of the Jury
A trial court may not communicate with the jury unless the
defendant, defendant's counsel and the state are present.2"' More-
over, in Ivory v. State,262 the Supreme Court of Florida made it clear
that such improper communication constitutes harmful error:
Any communication with the jury outside the presence of the
prosecutor, the defendant, and defendant's counsel is so fraught
with potential prejudice that it cannot be considered harmless.
[Ilt is prejudicial error for a trial judge to respond to a
request from the jury without the prosecuting attorney, the de-
fendant, and defendant's counsel being present and having the
opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action to be
taken on the jury's request. This right to participate includes the
right to place objections on record as well as the right to make
full argument as to the reasons the jury's request should or should
not be honored .2
In Henry v. State,'2 1 the jury, after receiving instructions on
nine charges related to murder, informed the judge: "we do have a
problem understanding the difference in murder in the first degree
and murder in the second degree." ' After a conference with coun-
sel, the court reinstructed the jury only on first and second degree
murder, overruling the defendant's request for reinstruction on all
degrees of unlawful homicide and upon justifiable and excusable
homicide .2
In affirming the trial judge's limited reinstruction, the Supreme
Court of Florida noted that it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to determine the feasibility and scope of reinstruction.21 The
259. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390(a).
260. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 149 Fla. 365, 5 So. 2d 703 (1942); Taylor v. State, 320
So. 2d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). This assumes a timely objection where appropriate.
261. Ivory v. State, 351 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1977); McQuay v. State, 352 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.
1st DCA 1977).
For example, in McQuay, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that it was
reversible error for the bailiff, without the presence of defense counsel, to reply to the jury's
question regarding the effect of the failure of a jury to come to a verdict.
262. 351 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1977).
263. Id. at 28.
264. 359 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1978).
265. Id. at 865.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 866.
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court cautioned, however, that the reinstruction must be complete
and not give the appearance of placing the trial judge in the role of
an interested advocate rather than an impartial arbiter. ' The su-preme court concluded by stating that where, as in Henry, the rein-
struction responds directly and impartially to the jury's question,
"[riequiring the court to repeat all of its original instructions
whenever the jury requests additional instructions on a particular
point would be both exhausting and time consuming to the court,
the jury and the parties. ' '269
IX. SENTENCING
A. Credit, General Sentences and Split Sentences
Credit is now granted automatically to defendants for time in-
carcerated while awaiting trial and sentencing."' Moreover, any
sentence must take into account time spent in a state hospital pur-
suant to commitment under the mentally disordered sex offender
program.2'
In the area of general sentences, it is now well settled that trial
judges may no longer commit a person to a prison term "at hard
labor." 2 Furthermore, a general sentence may not be imposed upon
a defendant convicted of multiple offenses, even if the defendant
pled guilty to all offenses charged? 3 Rather, any sentence given
must specify for which offense it has been imposed.
Florida's split sentencing statute274 provides that a sentencing
judge may prescribe a set period of incarceration, followed by a
specified period of probation. In State v. Holmes,75 the Supreme
268. Id. at 867.
269. Id. In reaching its decision, the supreme court distinguished its opinion in Hedges
v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965). The court stated that Hedges merely held "that where a
jury specifically requests reinstruction on the 'different degrees' of the charges levied, and,
accordingly, the court reinstructs on manslaughter and the other d6rees of unlawful homi-
cide, the court is then compelled to reinstruct on excusable justifiable homicide as a necessary
concomitant of manslaughter." 359 So. 2d at 867.
270. FLA. STAT. § 921.161(1) (1977); see Brooks v. State, 349 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977) (per curiam).
271. FLA. STAT. § 917.218 (1977); see Hall v. State, 358 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
(per curiam).
272. Brooks v. State, 349 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
273. Dorfman v. State, 351 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1977). In'Dorfman, the Supreme Court of
Florida rendered a scathing condemnation of the use of general sentences in this context:
"The evil of a general sentence . . . inheres in the uncertainty that its inscrutability creates,
for if the trial judge had committed reversible error as to any count for any reason, the entire
sentence would have to be vacated." Id. at 957.
274. FLA. STAT. § 948.01(4) (1977).
275. 360 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1978).
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Court of Florida made it clear that the combined split sentences
cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration allowable
under the statute defining the crime."' If probation is revoked, how-
ever, a trial judge may impose any initially valid sentence, less time
already served. 7
In Alvarez v. State,278 the Supreme Court of Florida made it
equally clear that a defendant convicted of a life felony may be
sentenced to any term, even a term presumptively longer than the
defendant's life expectancy. According to the court, "[any sen-
tence no matter how short, may eventually extend beyond the life
of the prisoner. Mortality and life expectancy are irrelevant to limi-
tations ....""'
Section 775.084 of the Florida Statutes (1977) provides en-
hanced sentences for habitual felony offenders. In Grey v. State,'
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that as a condi-
tion precedent to the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the
recidivist statute, the trial court must make a determination based
on a preponderance of evidence that the enhanced sentence is neces-
sary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the
defendant.0' Moreover, the court emphasized that the evidence re-
lied upon by the trial court for the enhanced sentence must be
produced in open court. 22
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
Section 775.087(2) of the Florida Statutes (1977) prescribes a
three year minimum term of imprisonment for the conviction of
certain enumerated felonies if the perpetrator had in his possession
a firearm. The Supreme Court of Florida, although recognizing the
constitutionality of these mandatory minimum sentencing provi-
sions,283 has directed that the provisions must be narrowly con-
strued. 8' Only the crimes specifically enumerated in the statute
require the three-year minimum sentence if a firearm were used. 5
276. Id. at 383.
277. Id. Defendant, however, is not given credit for time spent on probation.
278. 358 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1978).
279. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
280. 362 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
281. Id. at 426; Grimmett v. State, 357 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
282. 362 So. 2d at 426.
283. D'Alessandro v. Shearer, 360 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1978); Sowell v. State, 342 So. 2d 969
(Fla. 1977).
284. See Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1977); State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 603
(Fla. 1977).
285. See Jones v. State, 356 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (statute lists "any murder"
but does not specify manslaughter); Rozier v. State, 353 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per
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Moreover, the mandatory minimum sentences only apply to an indi-
vidual who was in personal possession of a firearm during the com-
mission of the crime. The provisions do not apply to persons who
participated in an enumerated felony in which another participant
possessed a firearm.28 In addition the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, has held that consecutive three year sentences are
not required for multiple count convictions and that the trial judge
has discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent minimum three
year sentences in such cases.2 7
C. Authority to Modify the Sentence
The trial court may reduce a legally imposed sentence within
sixty days and may correct an illegally imposed sentence at any
time.288 A trial court may also correct clerical mistakes in its judg-
ment and records at any time. 89 It is now clear, however, that once
a notice of appeal has been filed from the judgment and sentence,
exclusive jurisdiction vests in the appellate court.290 If, however, an
appellate court has affirmed the judgment of conviction or the sen-
tence imposed, or has denied an appeal or petition for certiorari, the
trial court can reduce the sentence within sixty days of receipt of
the appellate court's order.'
D. Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders
Section 917.13 of the Florida Statutes (1977) vests the trial
court with discretion to defer sentencing a defendant who has been
convicted or has pled guilty to a sex offense."2 Instead, the court
curiam) (manslaughter not specified in statute). The statute lists the following felonies:
"murder, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery,
kidnapping, escape, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, or aircraft piracy,
or any attempt to commit" these crimes. FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2)(a).(1977).
286. Earnest v. State, 351 So. 2d 957, 958 (Fla. 1977) (provisions do not apply to
"vicarious possession").
287. Brown v. State, 353 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (also holding that mandatory
minimum sentence does not preclude allowance of credit for time served prior to imposition
of sentence).
288. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800.
289. Perry v. State, 357 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam) (error in bench
docket); see Biggs v. Wainwright, 223 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1969).
290. Depson v. State, 363 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam); Kelly v. State,
359 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
291. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.800(b); see State v. Mancil, 354 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978);
State v. Migdahl, 353 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); State ex rel. Lewis v. Sandstrom, 350
So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
292. FLA. STAT. § 917.14 (1977) provides that this certification may be made on the
motion of the court, the defendant or the state.
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may certify the defendant for a hearing and examination to deter-
mine whether he is a mentally disordered sex offender. Although
certification of a defendant is totally within the discretion of the
trial court, once a defendant has been certified, the hearing proce-
dure is mandatory. 3 Moreover, it is improper for a trial court to
defer until after the defendant has Served his sentence the determi-
nation as to whether the defendant needs treatment."4
In Gammill v. Wainwright,2"' the Supreme Court of Florida
declared that once a defendant has been committed for treatment,
the trial court must defer sentencing until treatment is completed." 6
Furthermore, the trial court, in sentencing, must consider any reha-
bilitative effect the treatment may have had on the defendant. Ac-
cording to the supreme court, this procedure is necessary to give
effect to the treatment purpose of the statute without preventing the
trial court from requiring a prison term where circumstances indi-
cate that it is necessary. 97
E. Probation
In Hines v. State,25 the Supreme Court of Florida determined
that affidavits charging violations of probation which merely allege
that the probationer has been arrested for a felony are an insuffi-
cient basis for permanent revocation of probation.29 In Hines, the
defendant had conceded that the evidence introduced at his proba-
tion revocation hearing was sufficient to justify the revocation of his
probation. He contended, however, that although an affidavit
merely alleging that a probationer has been arrested for a certain
felony is a sufficient basis for temporary revocation of probation, a
permanent revocation must be based upon an affidavit alleging that
the probationer actually committed the crime charged and must
provide sufficient allegations as to the essential factual elements of
that crime.m ,,
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida emphasized that
293. Cook v. State, 357 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
294. Hoshaw v. State, 359 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
If the trial court finds that a defendant is a mentally disordered sex offender, it must
commit him for care, treatment and rehabilitation and defer sentencing until treatment has
been completed. FLA. STAT. § 917.19 (1977); see Gonsonovowski v. State, 350 So. 2d 19 (Fla.
2d DCA 1977).
295. 357 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978).
296. Id. at 716.
297. Id.
298. 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978).
299. Id. at 185.
300. Id. at 184.
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probation revocation procedures must comply with minimum re-
quirements of due process, and that it is generally improper perma-
nently to revoke probation based solely upon proof that a proba-
tioner has been arrested.ssI Fundamental fairness requires that a
defendant be placed on notice as to what he must do or refrain from
doing while on probation. The supreme court, therefore, directed
that any affidavit upon which a permanent revocation of probation
is to be based must set forth the basic facts concerning the alleged
violation, including its nature, time and place of occurrence. 02 The
court noted, however, that an affidavit for revocation of probation
need not set forth factual allegations with the specificity required
in criminal indictments and informations .3
F. Conditions of Probation
In Isaacs v. State3" and Pace v. State,305 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, upheld, as a condition of probation, a trial
court's imposition of the requirement that the probationer consent
to a search of his person, residence or automobile by any law en-
forcement officer at any time." In Grubbs v. State,307 however, the
Fourth District, when presented with the identical question, chose
not to follow its past decisions. Instead, the Fourth District certified
the question of the propriety of such conditions to the Supreme
Court of Florida.ss Since the supreme court has not yet rendered its
decision on the question, the validity of such conditions remains in
doubt.
301. Id. at 185 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)).
302. Id. at 185.
303. Id. In Hines, the supreme court conceded that the written factual allegations in the
affidavit for violation of probation did not provide sufficient notice to Hines of the charges
against him. Nonetheless, the court found no violation of due process and upheld the revoca-
tion since the record clearly indicated that the probationer had actual notice of the charges,
that he had been arrested near the scene of the crime shortly after its occurrence, and that
he had confessed to his involvement. Id.
304. 351 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
305. 350 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
306. In Pace, the Fourth District stated that such a condition passes muster under a
probationer's diminished fourth and fifth amendment rights. Id. at 1076.
307. 362 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
308. Id. at 397. The district court stated:
[W]e feel this question is of great public interest and accordingly the following
question is hereby certified to the Supreme Court:
Is a condition of probation requiring a probationer to consent to a
search at any time, by any law enforcement officer, violative of the
probationer's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States' Constitution or Article I, Section 12 of the Florida
Constitution?
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Restitution has long been considered a proper condition of pro-
bation.3" In Bunting v. State,3t 0 however, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Fourth District, cautioned that trial courts do not have author-
ity to impose restitution in addition to a term of imprisonment
where the sentencing statute does not authorize restitution as a
means of punishment. In addition, in Byrd v. State,"' the Fourth
District declared that in the case of an indigent defendant, restitu-
tion is a'n improper condition of probation.
X. DEATH PENALTY
Section. 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes (1977), requires a
separate sentencing hearing in all cases in which a defendant has
been convicted of a capital crime. In this hearing, the sentencing
jury and judge must determine whether a death sentence is appro-
priate by weighing the aggravating factors proven by the prosecu-
tion against the mitigating factors presented by the circumstances
of the case." 2 Although the aggravating factors which can be consid-
309. See, e.g., Cuba v. State, 362 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
310. 361 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
311. 353 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
312. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)-(6) (1977), which provide:
(5) AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES-Aggravating circumstances
shall be limited to the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of impris-
onment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive deviceor bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(6) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES-Mitigating circumstances shall
be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented
to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
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ered by the judge and jury are confined to those enumerated in the
statute, there is no similar restriction on the consideration of miti-
gating circumstances . 3 In fact, in Songer v. State,"4 the Supreme
Court of Florida made it clear that this nonexclusive construction
of the mitigating circumstances section is necessary for the death
penalty statute to pass muster under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States.3 1 5
A. "Doubling Up" of Aggravating Circumstances
Several of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in section
921.141(5) overlap, and, in some circumstances, trial courts have
found the existence of two aggravating factors supported by the
same set of facts. For example, in Provence v. State,38 the sentenc-
ing court found a murder had been committed during the commis-
sion of a robbery. Based upon these same facts, the court also deter-
mined that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain".31 Recog-
nizing that the existence of both aggravating circumstances would
be present in all robbery murders, and not where the murder was
committed in the course of any other enumerated felony, the Su-
preme Court of Florida held that such "doubling up" of aggravating
factors could not be approved since it would unreasonably tip the
scales in favor of the death sentence.3 18
Similarly, in Ellege v. State,"' the Supreme Court of Florida
held that the addition of a nonstatutory aggravating factor into the
weighing process constitutes reversible error where mitigating cir-
cumstances exist. In Jackson v. State,2 0 however, the Supreme
Court of Florida, relying on Provence and Ellege, upheld a death
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person. 4 .
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the crimiiality of his con-
duct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially
impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
313. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (considera-
tion of defendant's voluntary surrender and ultimate guilty plea appropriate); McCaskill v.
State, 344 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 1977) (review of facts in light of other decisions to determine if
death sentence appropriate); Chambers v. State, 339 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1976) (consideration of
the totality of the circumstances).
314. 365 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
315. Id. at 700. See also Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1978).
316. 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).
317. 337 So. 2d at 786.
318. Id.
319. 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977).
320. 359 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 881 (1979).
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sentence even though it was based on doubling up of statutory ag-
gravating circumstances, since no mitigating circumstances existed.
According to the court, in such cases there is no danger that an
unauthorized aggravating factor has served to overcome the miti-
gating circumstances in the weighing process.32'
The same reversible error test applies in cases where a trial
court has improperly considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor
in the weighing process. In Mikenas v. State,"32 the trial court listed
as an aggravating factor the defendant's substantial history of prior
criminal activity. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the nonstatutory circumstance should not have been consid-
ered by the trial court and, since there had been mitigating circum-
stances, required the case to be remanded for resentencing.23
B. Heinous, Atrocious and Cruel Murders
Conviction of a capital felony which was "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" is considered an aggravating circumstance in
the determination of whether to impose the death penalty.2 ' In
State v. Dixon,31 the Supreme Court of Florida limited this statu-
tory factor to those capital felonies which are accompanied by such
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital
felonies. Only those conscienceless or pitiless murders which are
unnecessarily tortuous to the victims are included in this category."'
Applying this standard, in Salvatore v. State,"7 the Supreme
Court of Florida upheld the trial court's finding that the defendant's
actions were heinous, atrocious and cruel. In Salvatore, the defen-
dant and several coconspirators concocted an elaborate plan to mur-
der a wealthy business associate. The victim was lured into the
business office and attacked with a steel pipe. Two of the conspira-
tors took turns beating the victim to death, while the victim repeat-
edly begged for mercy.32
321. Id. at 1001-03.
322. 43 FLA. L.W. 529 (Fla. Nov. 9, 1978) (No. 75-579C).
323. Id. at 530.
324. FLA. STA. § 921.141(5)(h) (1977).
325. 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
326. Id. at 9.
327. 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978).
328. Id. at 426. Applying the same standard, the Supreme Court of Florida also found
heinous, atrocious and cruel crimes. In Jackson v. State, 359 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1978) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 881 (1979), the defendant and a companion abducted a couple
and drove them to an isolated area. The male victim was shot while resisting his captors but
somehow managed to escape. The female victim was shot and was stuffed in the car's trunk
still alive. She was then transported to another isolated area. An electrical cord was tied
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In Riley v. State,32 however, the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the trial court's finding of heinous, atrocious and cruel
circumstances because the trial court had not focused its inquiry on
the effect of the defendant's acts on the victim. In Riley, the trial
court had found the fact that the victim's son was forced to watch
his father's execution to be sufficiently atrocious to* warrant the
death penalty. In reversing, the supreme court stated that "[tihere
was nothing atrocious (for death penalty purposes) done to the vic-
tim . . who died instantaneously from a gunshot in the head."330
C. Murder to Avoid Lawful Arrest
Another aggravating circumstance occurs when a capital felony
is committed for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest. 3' In Riley v.
State,332 the Supreme Court of Florida construed this factor to in-
clude the murder of witnesses, who are not law enforcement person-
nel, where the proof of intent to avoid arrest and detection is very
strong. Also, in Washington v. State,33 the supreme court upheld
the application of this factor even though the defendant has eventu-
ally surrendered to the police and confessed to the crime.
D. Sentencing Disparity
In Slater v. State, 33' the Supreme Court of Florida vacated the
defendant's death sentence because a more culpable accomplice
had received a life sentence. The court recently reaffirmed this prin-
ciple in Jackson v. State,335 stating that " 'defendants should not be,
treated differently upon the same or similar facts.' ,,33" In Jackson,
around her neck, and she was covered with branches and shrubs. In that condition, she was
left to die, and she finally suffocated. The trial court noted that the viptim was eight months
pregnant at the time of her death.
In Smith v. State, 356 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1978),
the defendant and two accomplices planned the robbery of a homosexual. After robbing the
victim, the criminals put the victim in the trunk of his car and drove him to an isolated area.
The defendant then hit the victim with a tire iron while an accomplice repeatedly stabbed
him with an icepick. Believing the man to be dead, the murderers locked the victim in the
trunk, doused the car with gasoline, and set it afire. Expert testimony revealed the victim
had died from incineration or asphyxiation.
329. 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
330. Id. at 21.
331. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(e) (1977).
332. 366 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
333. 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam). In Washington, the supreme court noted
that the defendant surrendered only after his accomplices had been arrested. Id. at 661.
334. 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
335. 366 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
336. Id. at 757 (quoting Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1973)).
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however, the court held that the disparity between the sentences
imposed on the codefendants was justified because the defendant
receiving the death penalty was more culpable under the total cir-
cumstances of the case and was the dominating force in the commis-
sion of the crime.3 7
E. Jury Recommendations
In Buckrem v. State,13 the Supreme Court of Florida reaf-
firmed the rule that:
"A jury recommendation under our trifurcated death penalty
statute should be given great weight. In order to sustain a sent-
ence of death following. a jury recommendation of life, the facts •
suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing
that virtually no reasonable person could differ."' 1
Buckrem involved a personal dispute between neighbors in the
apartment building. During the late evening, the defendant, who
had been drinking heavily, insulted his neighbor's girlfriend. The
neighbor struck the defendant, who fell and sustained cuts on his
face. While his wife washed the blood off his face, the defendant
stated that he was going to kill his neighbor. Early the next morning
the defendant broke into the neighbor's apartment, struck the
neighbor in the eye with the barrel of a gun and then shot him. The
girlfriend was then shot to death."'
After Buckrem had been found guilty, the jury recommended
that-a life sentence be imposed. The trial court, however, imposed
the death sentence.34" ' The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stat-
ing:
Defendant Buckrem was drinking during the night the homi-
cide was committed. He had a previous altercation with Caylor
and was obvibbsly disturbed, as well as intoxicated. The defen-
dant had no previous criminal activity, was gainfully employed,
but engaged in the use of alcoholic beverages on weekends. On
the facts and circumstances of this case, there is insufficient rea-
son shown by the record to override the jury's advisory sentence.
After carefully reviewing the entire record we conclude that the
court should have followed the jury's recommendation for life
sentence.3 1
337. Id.; see Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 704, 708 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
338. 355 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1978).
339. Id. at 113 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
340. Id. at 112.
341. Id. at 112-13.
342. Id. at 113-14. In upholding the jury's recommendation, the court recognized that
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F. Mitigating Circumstances
In Hargrave v. State,3 3 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
Where a defendant in a capital case presents evidence in the penalty
phase of the trial in support of one or more mitigating circumstan-
ces, the jury and the trial court are not required to make a finding
that such mitigating factor exists. The court emphasized that the
judge and jury are free to weigh the sufficiency of that evidence and
its credibility, and conclude that there is an insufficient basis for a
finding in favor of the defendant. Given this attitude, it appears
unlikely that the Supreme Court of Florida will reverse a judge's
and jury's rejection of evidence offered in mitigation.
Additionally, the youth of a defendant may not always be con-
sidered a mitigating circumstance. While in Mikenas v. State,3 the
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a finding of mitigation where the
defendant was twenty-two years old, in Meeks v. State45 the court
upheld the trial court's refusal to consider a twenty-one year old
defendant's youth as a mitigating circumstance.
G. Presentence Investigation Reports
During the survey period there has been great debate on
whether the State of Florida should continue using presentence in-
vestigation ("PSI") reports in capital cases. 346 The Supreme Court
of Florida invited public defenders, prosecutors and the legal com-
munity to file briefs and to argue the merits of PSI reports. 347 This
discussion of the effectiveness or usefulness of PSI reports was
prompted by the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Gardner v. Florida . 3, Gardner held that a defendant in a criminal
case must be afforded the opportunity to refute all matters con-
tained in the PSI report which were considered by the sentencing
court.3' After months of deliberation, the Supreme: Court of Florida
held that no changes would be made regarding the use of PSI reports
in capital cases." According to the court, the PSI report is an im-
the extreme emotional condition of a defendant in a murder case can be a basis for mitigating
punishment. Id. at 113.
343. 366 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam).
344. 43 FLA. L.W. 529 (Fla. Nov. 9, 1978) (No. 75-579C).
345. 339 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 1976).
346. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 3.710, 362 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 1978)
(per curiam).
347. Id.
348. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
349. Id. at 360-62.
350. 362 So. 2d at 656.
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portant tool that should continue to be available to the trial court.35'
A trial court has great discretion in the use of a PSI report and
may order such a report directed solely to matters in mitigation.3"2
Although Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170 requires a PSI
report in all cases where the defendant is found guilty of his first
felony offense or is convicted of a felony while under the age of
eighteen, this rule does not apply to capital sentencing cases.35 3
Finally, disclosure: of the PSI report is necessary only if the trial
court has considered such material in imposing the death sentence.
If the trial court were "aware" of certain facts contained in the PSI
report but expressly states that it did not "consider" the informa-
tion in its sentencing determination, disclosure is not required.354
H. Use of Photographs
Aldridge v. State355 was concerned with the problem of the
prosecutor's use "of gory photographs of a dead victim's body. In
Aldridge, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the prosecutor's
introduction into evidence of a photograph of a murder victim's
body near the restaurant which the victim had owned, even though
the parties had stipulated to the date and place of the death. In so
holding, the supreme court restated the rule that any relevant
photographs may be admitted into evidence.3 15 According to the
court, the photo was relevant to details of the events leading up
to the crime in that it showed the location of the victim's body in
relation to the restaurant which had been robbed. Moreover, the
court determined that this one photograph was not so objectionable
and inflammatory'as to require setting aside the jury's verdict. 57
In Jackson v. State,3 however, the Supreme Court of Florida
issued a strong warning to Florida prosecutors "that gory and grue-
some photographs admitted primarily to inflame the jury will result
in a reversal of the conviction. '356 In Jackson, the supreme court
found that three photographs taken of the murdered victims were
gruesome, but upheld the conviction relying on prior cases which
have held that offensive matter depicted in photographs will not
prohibit them from being admitted into evidence if relevant.
351. Id.
352. Salvatore v. State, 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978).
353. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.710.
354. Alford v. State, 355 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 935 (1978).
355. 351 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 220 (1978).
356. Id. at 943.
357. Id. at 943-44.
358. 359 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 881 (1979).
359. Id. at 1191.
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I. Pretrial Publicity
In Hoy v. State,6 0 the Supreme Court of Florida announced
guidelines for granting a change of venue because of pretrial public-
ity. In that case, two young people were brutally murdered. The two
major newspapers in that county covered the investigation exten-
sively. In one newspaper, the coverage included a first page reprint
of the defendant's confession. The defendant moved for a change of
venue based on pretrial publicity, which-was denied by the trial
judge.M1
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, relying on Dobbert
v. State,3 2 held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in denying defendant's motion. The court stated that in Hoy, as in
Dobbert, the trial judge had carefully questioned each group of
prospective jurors to ensure their impartiality."3 The trial judge's
voir dire, the supreme court noted, produced evidence that the
newspaper that published the confessions also published with equal
prominence the defendant's retraction of his confession. 34 In addi-
tion, the court found it significant that none of the jurors had read
the articles in question, and that many of the prospective jurors did
not even subscribe to the newspapers in question. 5 The court also
stressed the fact that the defense only utilized twenty-five of its
forty preemptory challenges."66
In conclusion, when Hoy is viewed in the shadow of Dobbert,
it now appears extremely difficult to build a record sufficient to
reverse a trial court's denial. of a motion for change of venue where
the trial judge has conducted a careful voir dire. Any such attempt
should focus not only on the inflammatory content of local news
articles, but also on the pervasive effect of the publicity on com-
munity sentiment.
360. 353 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1977) (per curiam).
361. Id. at 827-28.
362. 328 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1976).
363. 353 So. 2d at 829.
364: Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 831.
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